

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 02/01/2007

To: Washington Field

From: Washington Field  
Squad AMX-1/NVRA

Contact: SA [REDACTED]

Approved By: [REDACTED]

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Drafted By: [REDACTED]

Case ID #: 279A-WF-222936 (Pending) - 7620  
279A-WF-222936-BEI (Pending) - 1  
279A-WF-222936-BEI-FISUR (Pending) - 1

Title: AMERITHRAX;  
MAJOR CASE 184

Synopsis: Opening of sub-files for the captioned matter.

Details: It is requested that the following sub-files be opened  
for the captioned investigation.

CODE

SUBFILE

BEI Bruce Edwards Ivins  
BEI-FISUR Bruce Edwards Ivins Surveillance Reports

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02A  
[REDACTED]  
2-1-07  
[REDACTED]

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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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b7CDate of transcription 11/21/2001

On 11/19/2001, Bruce E. Ivins, Ph.D., (PROTECT IDENTITY)  
USAMRIID Bacteriology Division, 1425 Porter Street, Fort Detrick,  
Maryland 21702-5011, telephone number [REDACTED] fax number [REDACTED]  
email [REDACTED] was interviewed at [REDACTED]  
place of employment. After being advised of the identity of the  
interviewing agents, Ivins provided the following information.

Ivins was interviewed regarding [REDACTED]Ivins said [REDACTED]

did not know if [REDACTED] had left or right wing political views, or  
if [REDACTED] is a republican or democrat. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] said we should interview [REDACTED]

Ivins said [REDACTED] had access to B. anthracis, the  
knowledge about how to disseminate it, and had unrestricted access  
to B. anthracis. Ivins said the labs works with the bacteria,  
bacillus anthracis, suspended in a liquid because the powder form  
is too dangerous.

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b7E[REDACTED] 302b6  
b7CInvestigation on 11/19/2001 at USAMRIID, Ft. Detrick, Frederick, MDFile # 279A-WF-222936-160 WF-222936-BEI-42 Date dictated 11/21/2001by SA [REDACTED]

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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 1/31/02

On January 23, 2002, BRUCE IVINS contacted Special Agent [redacted] of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) at the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland, regarding recently-obtained information about Bacillus anthracis. IVINS provided two color digital photographs of Bacillus anthracis growing on agar plates and also provided the following information:

IVINS [redacted] work with the oldest and most original culture of the AMES strain of Bacillus anthracis at USAMRIID. [redacted]

[redacted] made several passages of the AMES by transferring it from plate to plate rather than going back to [redacted] original sample. The transfers, sometimes referred to as serial dilutions or passages, cause genetic mutations. It appears that the mutations may have resulted in differences in morphology between [redacted] "stock" of AMES and the original USAMRIID-AMES. The photographs provided by IVINS show the two "stocks" (the original and [redacted] at approximately 42 hours of growth. The morphological differences are not apparent until after more than 24 hours of growth. The differences include a grainy-like whitish growth and border variations in the [redacted] "stock" which are not visible in the original USAMRIID "stock" of AMES thus far.

USAMRIID also has a stock of AMES spores made for them at Dugway Proving Ground. There could be other stocks of AMES at USAMRIID, but IVINS does not know of any more than the three. IVINS does not have access to [redacted] AMES which is maintained [redacted]

IVINS has all of the records of transfers of the original USAMRIID stock of AMES. Even if [redacted] transferred some of it, IVINS would still have the record of the transfer. IVINS feels his records of the transfers are very accurate. The AMES stock from the original slant was sent to Dugway Proving Ground, Battelle Memorial Research Institute, [redacted] D.R.E.S (the Defense Research Establishment at Suffield, Canada), and to [redacted] the University of New Mexico. Samples from [redacted] collection were sent to Porton Down, who sent [redacted]

Investigation on 1/23/02 at Fort Detrick, Maryland

File # 279A-WF-222936-362-919 Date dictated 1/25/02

by SA [redacted] IVINS, 302

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Continuation of FD-302 of BRUCE IVINS, On 1/23/02, Page 2

[redacted] who sent it to [redacted] IVINS is not aware of any other transfers of AMES from USAMRIID.

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IVINS knows of two people who have the knowledge and character required to have prepared and sent the anthrax letters. He does not have any evidence that either of them actually did send the letters. [redacted]

[redacted] No one is supposed to remove any hot material from the USAMRIID facility. It would be possible to take material out without detection, and IVINS does not know if [redacted] took any of the Bacillus anthracis with [redacted]

The other person IVINS knew who could have produced the letters was [redacted]

[redacted] IVINS had previously called SA [redacted] at the Frederick, Maryland, FBI office to provide information about [redacted] "makes nice spores" of Bacillus anthracis, but the spores in the DASCHLE letter were of fermentation quality. The spores were very clean compared to Bacillus anthracis produced on agar which would contain messy residue. [redacted]

Anyone with access to the USAMRIID [redacted] has access to [redacted] stock of the AMES strain of Bacillus anthracis. Building [redacted] has the AMES produced at Dugway.

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If someone who had received the original USAMRIID AMES stock did the same kind of passages/transfers that [redacted] did, it is extremely unlikely that they would produce the same mutations to reflect the same morphological differences as the [redacted] stock. Mutations are random, and the likelihood of getting the same mutations is not great. There should be records

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Continuation of FD-302 of BRUCE IVINS, On 1/23/02, Page 3

in the various labs to show the number of passages used in any research conducted with the AMES strain. [ ] did not use pure culture technique, and the original stock in IVINS possession is "just a slant away from the cow" to his knowledge.

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[ ] use [ ] stock of AMES in their research. IVINS [ ] use the original USAMRIID AMES stock.

DNA sequencing should show the differences in genetics which cause the morphological differences between the two stocks of AMES. [ ] work in genotyping only looks at 1% or less of the total genome. The mutations causing the morphological differences would not show up in [ ] work.

IVINS has not worked with powdered or dry Bacillus anthracis. Bacillus anthracis is too dangerous to work with as a powder. Even the Medical Research & Development (R&D) Command had no idea that Dugway was working with powdered spores.

The aerosolization research conducted on animals at USAMRIID is all wet-mist exposure of animals to Bacillus anthracis. None of that work involves dry or powdered research.

IVINS showed SA [ ] a business card for [ ] which contained the following information:



DIGITAL photographs of the FBI evidence from the anthrax letters were also on IVINS computer, and he offered them to SA [ ]. Because SA [ ] understood the photographs were part of work being conducted by [ ] as evidence analysis in the case, SA [ ] asked IVINS to keep the digital photographs secured and did not accept the photographs of the

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Continuation of FD-302 of BRUCE IVINS, On 1/23/02, Page 4

evidence growth. IVINS agreed to make the photographs available if the case agents want them prior to receiving an official report from

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BRUCE IVINS is further described as follows:

Race:	White
Sex:	Male
Title:	Research Microbiologist
Place of Employment:	USAMRIID Bacteriology Division 1425 Porter Street Fort Detrick, Maryland 21702
Work telephone:	<span style="border: 1px solid black; display: inline-block; width: 140px; height: 25px; vertical-align: middle;"></span>
Fax:	
E-mail:	bruce.ivins@amedd.army.mil

~~SECRET~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

DATE: 12-09-2008  
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/LSC  
REASON: 1.4 (C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-09-2033Date of transcription 01/31/2002

Bruce Edwards Ivins, Ph.D., white male, DOB 4/22/46, SS# 280-44-5449, Building 1425, Room 19, U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Ft. Detrick, MD, telephone [REDACTED] home telephone [REDACTED] was interviewed at his place of employment, USAMRIID. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent and the purpose of the interview, Ivins, provided the following information:

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Ivins has been employed at USAMRIID since 12/80. Ivins has a B.S. degree from the University of Cincinnati in bacteriology, a M.S. degree from the University of Cincinnati in microbiology and a Ph.D. from the University of Cincinnati in microbiology.

Ivins does have an inventory of his *Bacillus anthracis* (*B. anthracis*). Ivins has maintained a strain inventory of his *B. anthracis* collection since before 9/11/01. A complete inventory of the Bacteriology Division's *B. anthracis* collection was completed by [REDACTED] on 1/29/02. Ivins noted that [REDACTED] is probably the most knowledgeable person in the United States related to *B. anthracis* spores. Ivins stated that Dugway Proving Grounds in Utah usually makes the spore preparations used in animal challenges at USAMRIID. Ivins maintains a detailed inventory of all these spore production preparations that have been sent from Dugway. All of this inventory is accounted for. Access to the strains of *B. anthracis* is logged by facility key cards which are maintained in the security office.

Ivins first began working on *B. anthracis* at USAMRIID in 1980-81. This work began as a result of the Sverdlovsk incident. Following this incident, [REDACTED] sent out a request to various laboratories to obtain samples of *B. anthracis*. Prior to that time [REDACTED] was at USAMRIID working with vaccine strains of *B. anthracis*. [REDACTED] now works at [REDACTED]

Ivins classifies his work with *B. anthracis* as vaccine development; specifically improving current vaccines and working on the development of a new vaccine. Ivins is aware that his division possesses Vollum 1B, Ames, Colorado, New Hampshire, Texas, and V770 strains of *B. anthracis*. [REDACTED] has a complete strain

Investigation on 1/29/02 at Fort Detrick, MDFile # 279A-WF-222936-2505 302-1869 Date dictated 1/30/02by SA [REDACTED]b6  
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b7cContinuation of FD-302 of Bruce Edwards Ivins, On 1/29/02, Page 2

inventory of all cultures maintained by the Bacteriology Division at USAMRIID.

Ivins obtained the Ames strain of *B. anthracis* from [ ] sometime between 1981 and 1983. Ivins obtained this strain to use as a challenge strain. Ivins did not regularly begin using Ames in his research until [ ] showed that the Ames strain was very "hot" in 1996. Prior to that time, Vollum 1B was the standard strain that was used in Ivins research. Full genetic characterization has not been done on all strains used in the Bacteriology Division, however, Ivins does know the properties of most of the strains, including the biochemical characteristics as well as virulence factors.

Regarding the origin of the Ames strain, Ivins recalls [ ] obtaining Ames for the first time in late 1980, possibly late December or in early 1981. Ivins has reviewed [ ] notebooks to find the first reference to the Ames strain. The earliest reference that Ivins found to Ames was in 12/81. Ivins found nothing in the notebooks prior to that date regarding Ames. Ivins provided a hand drawn diagram detailing the genesis of the Ames strain at USAMRIID. Ivins showed that he obtained *B. anthracis* from [ ] in 1985 which Ivins in turn shared with [ ]. From USAMRIID Ivins also sent out samples of this strain to Dugway Proving Grounds, the Defense Research Establishment Suffield (DRES), [ ] the University of New Mexico, and Battelle. Ivins is aware that [ ] provided [ ] strain, referred to as [ ] who in turn supplied it to Porton Down in Great Britain, and to [ ] Louisiana State University who in turn supplied the strain to [ ] the University of Northern Arizona.

The method of propagation of the Ames strain of *B. anthracis* differed between [ ] and Bruce Ivins. Ivins used single colony dilutions to propagate the Ames culture. [ ] used mass swipes of culture to propagate his collection. As a result, mutations became evident in [ ] collection of the strain that were not present in Ivins' strain collection. Ivins has documentation and records to back up all shipments of the Ames strain which he has sent out.

Ivins will provide isolates of the *B. anthracis* he has in his collection if needed by the FBI. Ivins noted that spore samples are usually maintained in a one percent phenol at USAMRIID

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Continuation of FD-302 of Bruce Edwards Ivins, On 1/29/02, Page 3

if the spores are stored in quantity. The phenol serves to destroy any contaminants, however, they do not affect the spores.

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Ivins collaborates with scientists at Battelle, [redacted] the University of Northern Arizona [redacted] D.R.E.S., [redacted] the University of New Mexico, and also Bio-Port, however, these shipments were only of Vollum 1B. Except for Bio-Port, Ivins has shared Ames with all of these institutions.

*B. anthracis* cultures are not routinely shared with other labs. However, Ivins cannot vouch for what others have done with their collections of *B. anthracis*. He stated that the commander of the institution must approve any transfer of *B. anthracis* or other Select Agents. Ivins is aware that [redacted] wanted the Ames strain of *B. anthracis* early in 2001. The United States Commerce Department denied the transfer. [redacted] apparently wanted the Ames strain for "genetic research". [redacted] at the Commerce Department was the contact involved with this event. Ivins provided a copy of the denial of export license to SA [redacted]

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[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted] has had access to the hot suite. [redacted] worked with *B. anthracis* and believes that [redacted] worked with [redacted]

The only persons whom Ivins is aware are working with *B. anthracis* as a Select Agent are those previously detailed as collaborating labs. Ivins is not aware of who may be working with *B. anthracis* overseas. Ivins is not aware of any "underground" publications or websites describing "home grown" anthrax.

Regarding other individuals whom Ivins thinks should be interviewed by the FBI, [redacted] is at the top of his list. Ivins noted that [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of Bruce Edwards Ivins, On 1/29/02, Page 4 b6  
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[redacted]  
Ivins believes that pharmaceutical companies would provide the technical expertise as well as the equipment that would be required to make weaponized *B. anthracis*.

Ivins currently only works with *B. anthracis*, however, 20 years ago he worked with cholera, chlamydia, and diphtheria toxin.

Regarding visiting scientists, Ivins recalls an [redacted]

[redacted]  
[redacted] Ivins did not believe that this was effective research.

Ivins related information regarding [redacted] Ivins regarded [redacted]

[redacted]  
[redacted] never talked to Ivins specifically about weaponizing *B. anthracis* nor did [redacted] mention belonging to any organized hate groups. However, Ivins felt that [redacted]  
[redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of Bruce Edwards Ivins, On 1/29/02, Page 5

[Redacted]

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Ivins believes that [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Ivins also mentioned a former employee who worked at USAMRIID named [Redacted] whom he regarded as someone who could possibly be involved in the anthrax attacks. Ivins recalls

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[Redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of Bruce Edwards Ivins, On 1/29/02, Page 6b6  
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Ivins stated that [REDACTED]

Ivins recalls that when [REDACTED]

Ivins also recalls that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] however, had no access to the hot suites. When asked who he would suspect as having been involved in the *B. anthracis* attacks, Ivins reiterated that [REDACTED] would be the prime suspects, however, [REDACTED] Ivins said that he had no involvement in the anthrax mailings and has had no training involving making powders. Ivins has never been to Trenton and has no associations with Trenton, NJ. Other than [REDACTED] Ivins is also not familiar with any individuals who have associations or contacts or have traveled to Trenton, NJ. Ivins said that the only person he is aware of at USAMRIID who may have any powdered materials would be [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] is someone whom Ivins regards as a good [REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of Bruce Edwards Ivins, On 1/29/02, Page 7

[REDACTED]

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Ivins is aware that [REDACTED] who wanted *B. anthracis* strains. He is also aware that Iraq wanted to obtain the Ames strain of *B. anthracis* from Porton Down in Great Britain. Ivins provided SA [REDACTED] with a complete inventory of the *B. anthracis* collection in the Bacteriology Department which he obtained [REDACTED]

There is no one at the facility who has been rumored to be attempting to gain access to *B. anthracis* or other Select Agents for which they do not have a legitimate need. Ivins is also unaware of anyone who has access to the materials or the ability to work with Select Agents who appears to be unstable or exhibit mental or emotional problems. Ivins speculated that if he were going to make anthrax to send through the mail, the first thing he would have to do would be to find someone who knew how to make the powder. He thought that this could either be [REDACTED] or someone from Dugway Proving Grounds. As far as Ivins knows, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Ivins does not know if Battelle has the capability to make the powders. Ivins stated that it would take someone with a degree in the sciences or someone who had great technical expertise and the ability to work the requisite equipment in order to make dried materials. Ivins fears that this prior event is a test for a larger scale attack or an attack with another Select Agent such as smallpox.

Ivins is not aware of an Internet website for bacteriology, however, there is an Intranet website which is maintained by [REDACTED] which contains SOPs on working with materials.

Ivins recalled an incident which occurred in the late 60s or early 70s regarding an individual named George Wright. Wright left Detrick in the late 60s or early 70s and apparently stuck some bottles of liquid *B. anthracis* cultures in a paint can and took them home. When USAMRIID began working with *B. anthracis* again in the early 1980s, Wright brought the can back to USAMRIID. Ivins noted that this would not contain the Ames strain because the Ames strain had not been discovered when Wright worked at USAMRIID. Ivins stated that Wright died several years ago.

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Continuation of FD-302 of Bruce Edwards Ivins, On 1/29/02, Page 8

Ivins noted that the ratio of spores to media for *B. anthracis* in a liquid preparation is approximately  $10^8$  spores per milliliter. Therefore, it would take 20 liters of media to make two grams of spores.

Ivins noted that [redacted] has been getting a lot of mileage from this event as [redacted] however, [redacted] at the time after Ames came to USAMRIID. Ivins has never heard [redacted] discuss politics. Ivins has also never heard of [redacted]  
[redacted]

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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 03/04/2002

BRUCE IVINS, Ph.D., Research Scientist, white male,  
approximately 40 years of age, United States Medical Research  
Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), 1490 Porter Street,  
Ft. Detrick, MD was advised of the identities of the Special Agents  
(SAs) and the nature of the interview. [redacted] was also  
present during the interview. IVINS provided the following  
information:

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IVINS recognized the mailing tube and the glass tube bearing the  
label "AMES 255414 B B. anthracis" shown in the digital photographs  
provided by [redacted] the photographs on February  
21, 2002 at the request of [redacted]

In 1985, IVINS took a sample of agar and bacteria from the glass  
tube and started a culture of the *B. anthracis* Ames strain. The  
glass tube was stored in the refrigerated area of the laboratory at  
the time IVINS took the 1985 sample. The culture that IVINS  
started in 1985 contained viable *B. anthracis*. IVINS maintained  
stocks of his 1985 culture at the current time.

IVINS. wps

[redacted]  
Y/Nb2  
b7EInvestigation on 2/26/2002 at Ft. Detrick, MDFile # 279A-WF-222936-LAB-82 Date dictated 3/4/2002by SA [redacted] SA 279A-WF-222936-302-1239b6  
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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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b7CDate of transcription 04/29/2002

On 04/24/2002 and 04/25/02, Special Agents [redacted] Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Washington Field Office (WFO), contacted BRUCE IVINS. This contact was initiated to collect information regarding reports that swabbing, which resulted in presumptive positive results, had been conducted outside the laboratory suites at United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Ft Detrick, Maryland. After the interviewing agents identified themselves and advised of the nature of the interview, IVINS voluntarily provided the following information:

BRUCE EDWARDS IVINS, social security number 280-44-5449, [redacted] home telephone [redacted] and work telephone [redacted] is further described as a PhD., Research Microbiologist, working in the Bacteriology Division at USAMRIID.

IVINS [redacted]  
[redacted] IVINS [redacted] currently work in the same division. [redacted]  
[redacted] when USAMRIID became involved in the evidence, Bacillus anthracis (B.A.), processing of the Daschle and Leahy letters. Consequently, [redacted] have only intermittent contact with [redacted]

In the Fall of 2001, soon after the receipt of Daschle letter, IVINS [redacted] conducted some preliminary work with the evidence. IVINS entered the evidence into the [redacted] level laboratory suite, through the pass-thru box.

In the Fall of 2001, [redacted] shared with IVINS [redacted] [redacted] concerned with the handling of the B.A. evidence. [redacted] had observed unsafe handling of the letter. Based on this conversation, IVINS became concerned about possible contamination outside the actual labs where the evidence was being handled. Over time, IVINS' concern extended to the office area [redacted]. He felt that if there had been unsafe handling then [redacted] could have inadvertently contaminated the office. IVINS also felt that [redacted]

Investigation on 04/24-25/2002 at Ft Detrick, Maryland

File # 279

SA [redacted]

by SA [redacted]

Date dictated N/A

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Continuation of FD-302 of BRUCE EDWARDS IVINS, On 04/24-25/2002, Page 2

were to fall in a dusty area, which had not subsequently been cleaned, it could still be there.

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Based on the above, in approximately December 2001, IVINS took the independent initiative to swab the office [redacted] [redacted] IVINS swabbed approximately twenty areas, to include [redacted] desk, telephone, and computer in an effort to determine the presence of B.A. Analysis of the samples the next day indicated that approximately half the samples yielded what appeared to have one or two colonies of B.A. This was considered a "presumptive positive" and IVINS conducted no further tests to confirm the presence of B.A. IVINS autoclaved and disposed of all the samples. IVINS told [redacted] of his findings, but was unsure if he actually showed [redacted] the samples. He then thoroughly cleaned [redacted]

At that time IVINS told nobody [redacted] of his swabbing efforts and findings. He felt he had effectively taken care of the issue [redacted]

On or about 04/11/02 or 04/12/02, IVINS became aware that there was a possible contamination incident in lab B3, and that [redacted] [redacted] had conducted samples in the suite and found several areas with "presumptive positives" for the presence of B.A. The contamination incident consisted of a possible spill during an experiment conducted by [redacted]

On the following Monday, 04/15/02, after thinking about it over the weekend and becoming increasingly more concerned about possible contamination immediately outside the B3 lab, IVINS decided to independently conduct swabbing surveys in areas likely, in his mind, to have been contaminated. IVINS conducted the swabbing effort on either 04/15/02 and 04/16/02, or 04/16/02 and 04/17/02. He realizes he should have requested authority from his superiors to conduct the surveys, but he was afraid it would be weeks before permission was granted due to "red-tape."

On 04/16/02, IVINS decided to swab the "cold-side" of the pass-thru box of B3, the cold-side men's changing room (because he could not get into the women's change room), [redacted] ("Cold-side" refers to areas outside the lab suites.) IVINS sampled the cold-side of the pass-thru box because [redacted] survey had found the presence of what appeared to be B.A. on the handle of the hot-side of the pass-thru box inside the B3 lab.

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b7cContinuation of FD-302 of BRUCE EDWARDS IVINS, On 04/24-25/2002, Page 3

IVINS swabbed the cold-side men's changing room because he was concerned about shoes worn inside B3 suite tracking spores into the changing room. IVINS swabbed [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] he wanted to see if he had done a good job cleaning it in December 2001.

On 04/17/02, IVINS analyzed the results of 04/16/02, and found "presumptive positive" for B.A. on five of approximately twenty to twenty-five samples. The positives were found on: 1) the molding by the pass-thru box; 2) mens changing room table; 3) the shelf over the sink in the men's changing room; 4) on top of the lockers in the men's changing room; and 5) [REDACTED]

Based on the above findings, IVINS continued his independently initiated swab survey by taking samples of his (IVINS') desk area (room 019), the cold-side pass-thru box area, and the freezers located in the hallway outside B3. The areas on which IVINS concentrated were those of high traffic area (such as a computer keyboard), and those of very low traffic (such as the top of a book shelf). Of the thirty-one samples, IVINS found approximately eleven what appeared to be "presumptive positives". The initial positives were found on: 1) outside the pass-thru box on the window sill; 2) outside the pass-thru box on the electrical box; 3) IVINS' office on the shelf under the air vent; 4) IVINS' office behind the computer monitor; 5) IVINS' office on IVINS' desk by penholder; 6) IVINS' desk on the penholder; 7) IVINS' office on the upper shelf in a tray to the left corner air vent; 8) IVINS' office on the metal folder holder on the top shelf to the right of corner air vent; 9) IVINS' office, top shelf of desk, left corner air vent; 10) IVINS' desk; and 11) IVINS' office on the wooden bookcase shelves to the left of desk. Of the eleven "presumptive positives", #1 and #6 were later eliminated as B.A.

After doing the first sample and getting the results, IVINS told [REDACTED] of his findings. IVINS told [REDACTED] that he was going to do further sampling [REDACTED]

On either the afternoon of 04/17/02 or the morning of 04/18/02, IVINS told [REDACTED] about his sampling survey and the

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Continuation of FD-302 of BRUCE EDWARDS IVINS, On 04/24-25/2002, Page 4

findings. [ ] became very upset with him and told him he should have gotten approval.

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On 04/18/02, IVINS went to [ ] and told [ ] of his sampling survey and the findings. [ ] was upset with IVINS for sampling without authority.

On the morning of 04/19/02, there was a "town hall meeting" where the incidents were discussed. They were notified that a large scale sampling survey would be conducted to determine the extent of contamination.

When asked why he was able to find B.A., when the other swabbing efforts did not, IVINS explained that he utilizes a more aggressive and extensive method for collecting samples. He samples a larger area, especially hard to reach and dusty areas, and uses more force. He also explained that prior to the large scale swabbing survey by the Center for Health Promotion and Preventative Medicine (CHPPM), he, [ ] took samples outside the B3 lab and subsequently cleaned the area thoroughly with bleach.

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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 05/02/2002

On 4/27/02 and 4/28/02, DR. BRUCE EDWARDS IVINS left voice messages for SA [REDACTED] at the FBI's Washington Field Office. SA [REDACTED] returned the call on 4/30/02. Being previously aware of the identity of the agent, IVINS provided the following information:

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IVINS is further identified as: social security number 280-44-5449, [REDACTED] home telephone [REDACTED] and work telephone [REDACTED]. He is a PhD., Research Microbiologist, working in the Bacteriology Division at the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Disease (USAMRIID).

During the week of 4/22/02, a schedule was devised by [REDACTED] for each research microbiologist to survey the biological safety level three suite B3 for possible contamination on a rotating weekly basis. IVINS was scheduled to do the survey the week of 4/29/02. IVINS proceeded to survey B3 by taking swabs, putting them on blood plates, and putting them into the fermenter. He was assisted by [REDACTED]. The survey was very aggressive. IVINS wanted to prove he could find contamination.

When IVINS went to observe the plates the following day, he found them in a plastic bag in the autoclave, where someone had disposed of them. He determined [REDACTED] had disposed of them because a new swabbing protocol was going to be established, but had not yet been written. If swabbing was not conducted according to protocol, discipline would result. IVINS could not have followed protocol because it was not yet written.

IVINS also wanted to follow up on the interview that was conducted of him on 4/24-25/02 by SA's [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. He remembered two times he had come across Bacillus anthracis (Ba) about which he had not previously informed the agents. Sometime between December 2001 and February 2002, [REDACTED] called IVINS and asked him to come to his office. [REDACTED] had Ba which had originated from another country at which he wanted IVINS to look. IVINS would not identify the country of origin, and stated that

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b7EInvestigation on 4/30/02 at Frederick, MarylandFile # 279A-WF-222936 SUB 302 BEI #7-1697Date dictated NAby SA [REDACTED]b6  
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ivins 2.302

279A-WF-222936 SUB 302

Continuation of FD-302 of BRUCE EDWARDS IVINS, On 4/30/02, Page 2

information would have to come from [ ] IVINS called it a "national security sample." The Ba was in a powdered form and orangish in color.

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During that same time period, [ ] again called IVINS to his office to look at more Ba from the same country. IVINS does not recall in what form the Ba was. IVINS grew some of the product on a blood plate, which he then left in laboratory suite [ ]. He took some of the product off the plate and froze it in broth.

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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 02/19/2003

On February 12, 2003, BRUCE E. IVINS, date of birth 04/22/1946, social security account number 280-44-5449, was interviewed at his place of employment, the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland, telephone [REDACTED]. After being advised of the identity of the agents and the purpose of the interview, IVINS provided the following information:

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IVINS provided the agents with a packet of materials that he prepared including: a list of individuals that the agents might want to contact; statements of his work on both the Daschle and New York Post letters; a spore calculation form for the Leahy letter; and a document labeled as "Hoover Statement" in which IVINS advised of his work with the letters as well as his independent swabbing project and safety concerns. These materials are attached herein.

IVINS advised that there was a safety problem with the handling of the anthrax letters at USAMRIID that put people's health at risk. Two people at USAMRIID had something to gain by the letters being analyzed at the lab, and the situation was just a nightmare for everyone else involved. As such, these two individuals had the most to lose from any problems uncovered with handling of the letters. IVINS identified these two individuals as

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IVINS heard from [REDACTED] have been saying that [REDACTED] IVINS did not handle the letters which is not true. IVINS gave copies of the report of his work on the letters to [REDACTED]

The Daschle letter should not have been in Room [REDACTED]. IVINS received the letter contained in ziploc bags in [REDACTED]. He did not know where the ziplocs came from. He was not aware of whether they were the original ziplocs which had been decontaminated, or if the letter was placed inside new ziplocs. IVINS does not know who processed the letter prior to his receipt of it or whether the letter was opened in [REDACTED]

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*SUB 302 - 3172*  
Investigation on 02/12/2003 at Fort Detrick, Maryland  
File # 279A-WF-222936 *570* [REDACTED] *-782* 279A-BA-C10139 Date dictated N/A  
by SA [REDACTED]  
*SUB BE1 - #8*

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279A-WF-222936-[ ] 302

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b7CContinuation of FD-302 of BRUCE E. IVINS, On 02/12/2003, Page 2

IVINS weighed an empty vial in Room [ ] and then brought the Daschle letter into Suite B3 through the passbox. [ ] he scraped out some powder from the letter into a vial. There was not much powder in the letter, and some was flying around in the hood. He brought the vial out through the B3 passbox and to [ ] to weigh it, as [ ] had the most accurate scale in the area. He then brought the vial back into B3.

[ ] was present in B3 while IVINS [ ] worked on the letter, [ ] was outside of the room watching them through the glass in the door. IVINS remembered wearing gloves when he handled the Daschle letter in the hood, but he could not recall if he wore gloves at any other time while working with the letter.

IVINS did not handle the Leahy, Post, or Brokaw letters. He worked with the powder from the Leahy and Post letters and did not work with any of the material from the Brokaw letter.

IVINS advised that latex gloves were used by people working in B3. The gloves were not of the greatest quality as they were bargain gloves and sometimes had holes or were torn. IVINS did not wear gloves when touching any commonly handled items in B3.

Outside of IVINS' work group, the B3 workspace was shared with [ ]. During the time that Suite B4 was down for renovation, many of the people that usually worked in B4 had to work in B3 instead. Suites B3 and B4 are connected in the back, and therefore one can usually pass between the two suites. When B4 went down for renovation it was sealed off from B3 as a cold area.

The ice machine and the centrifuge were in B3, therefore anyone who needed to use that equipment would have entered B3. This group included: [ ]

In approximately 1997, IVINS received some very clean *Bacillus anthracis* (B.a.) spore preparations from Dugway Proving Grounds. He thinks that all of the Dugway material had been fermented, as there was some talk about growing the B.a. in either 8 or 10 liter fermentors. The spores were double gradient purified.



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Continuation of FD-302 of BRUCE E. IVINS, On 02/12/2003, Page 3

The Dugway material has been kept in the cold room in B3 since it was received in 1997. There is a record of how much material was initially received as well as how much has been removed and where it went. IVINS thinks that all of the Dugway material has been stored with his lab group and kept in the two original flasks it was placed in. Each flask initially had 500 milliliters of wet spore preparation, and only one flask of material remains. IVINS advised that 1 milliliter or less of the Dugway material could be taken and it wouldn't be missed.

Double purified material needs to have a chromatogram done to determine whether it was run through a gradient. A trace of the gradient would remain on the material and should be indicated by a peak on the chromatogram. Some possible gradients include sucrose, hypaque, renografin (which became known as renocal but may not be manufactured any longer), or phycoll.

IVINS did the following calculation estimates to determine how much of the Dugway spores would have been missing if they had been used in the anthrax mailings. 2.0-2.5 grams of material were present in each letter with a  $10^8$ /mL spore concentration. In order to achieve that spore concentration, 80-100L of runs would have been necessary and approximately 300mL of the Dugway material would have been required. This amount of missing material would have been noticed.

IVINS thinks that most of the people at USAMRIID use broth to grow *B.a.*, although he can't say for certain how everyone else there grows their spores. Although *B.a.* can be grown on agar, nicer spores are produced in broth, and they can be purified more easily and are "hotter". If one needs to purify more than a very small amount of *B.a.*, it is difficult to use agar as you would need numerous plates.

Spores grown up on agar are dirtier than broth grown. IVINS does not know if this is because the spores pick up debris from the agar or if there are media components on the surface of the spore. No matter how agar grown spores are washed, some agar always remains on the spores.

The protocol that IVINS used to grow *B.a.* is the same one published in the paper titled "Efficacy of a human anthrax vaccine in guinea pigs, rabbits, and rhesus macaques against challenge by *Bacillus anthracis* isolates of diverse geographical origin". IVINS, [ ] and several other USAMRIID scientists co-authored



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the paper. All Ames spores that IVINS uses either come from the Dugway stock or have been made by his lab group by the published protocol.

The spores from the three letters that IVINS saw looked very different from each other. He described the spores from the Daschle letter as being very, very clean; the spores from the Leahy letter as looking good, with some clumping; and the spores from the Post letter as okay, with a good bit of clumping. IVINS asked [REDACTED] of the FBI if the Daschle letter could represent "downstream processing" in that the spores either went from bad to good or good to bad.

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At the agent's request, IVINS advised that he would check for any paperwork he may have submitted requesting a government vehicle to travel to Covance in Denver, Pennsylvania in the fall of 2001. He advised that he would ask [REDACTED] Last Name Unknown (LNU) who handles all such requests. IVINS also provided the agents with a copy of two emails that he received from the American Red Cross requesting his assistance with canteening for the FBI'S December pond operation near Frederick, Maryland.

IVINS did not have any copies of the Special Pathogens Section (SPS) records for the Post and Brokaw letters. He advised that [REDACTED] might have some knowledge of the timeline of the letters at USAMRIID. IVINS has never met or seen [REDACTED]

IVINS keeps his lab notebooks in his office rather than the library. The notebooks are officially checked out to him, and people working with him make entries in them and sign their name by the entry. IVINS agreed to provide the agents with access to his notebooks from the 2001 time frame. IVINS did not have any email records or electronic calendar records prior to May 2002. He thought that there may have been a new system installed around that time.

IVINS usually obtained office paper from the stock which had been ordered by the Bacteriology Division. He brought it into the office in a big box and would pull out a ream when he needed it. He did not keep any pre-stamped envelopes in his office. He advised that they do not need stamps on their envelopes because all outgoing mail from USAMRIID is supposed to be business only. IVINS does keep blank envelopes in his office.

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The door to IVINS' office was kept unlocked. People have had items taken from their offices at times. [ ]

[ ] In approximately December 2002, IVINS was working on a report for the FBI when [ ]

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When IVINS had an aerosol challenge scheduled, he would bring the tubes with the spore suspension to the aerosolization area. IVINS advised that the spore suspension looked like milk. The sprays are done in Building 1412 in the room next to [ ] and [ ] are where IVINS and his lab group processed material during the sprays to include plating out the material to quantify the spore concentration. [ ] usually conducted the sprays for IVINS.

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After an aerosol challenge was completed, B.a. would be present on bottles, tubes, pipets and plates. The plates would be placed in a biohazard bag to be autoclaved. Tubes, bottles, and pipets would be held in a hood that was not being used and decontaminated within one week. IVINS gave the example of a spray that was to take place on Tuesday and Wednesday of a given week: the animals would be prepared Monday, the spray would be conducted Tuesday and Wednesday, the plates would be counted Thursday, and the final clean up would take place Friday.

IVINS took the agents on a walk through of the areas of Building 1425 where he handled the anthrax letters. He received the Daschle letter contained in two or three ziploc bags from [ ] He took the letter through the B3 passbox into Room [ ] IVINS' lab space in B3. [ ] can be seen through the window to the left of the B3 passbox as well as through the B3 crash door. He brought the vial containing B.a. from the Daschle letter out through the B3 passbox and to the scale in [ ] a BL2 lab. IVINS thinks that the vial he used is still in the refrigerator in [ ]

IVINS pointed out the B3 cold room as being on the right side of the hallway when looking through the crash door, with a black box on the door. Room [ ] is the pass through to suite B4. The mouse animal room is the third door down on the right when looking through the crash door. The guinea pig room is across the

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hall with the cleaning supplies for the suite located to the right of the door as the room is entered.

IVINS was in B3 when the B.a. from the letter went all over the place in the hood. He does not know how the hood was decontaminated, and he does not recall decontaminating it himself and advised that he would probably remember if he had done it. He does not remember if [REDACTED] decontaminated the hood. IVINS did not routinely record such things during that time frame.

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IVINS was recently at Home Depot and saw the many different grades of sandpaper that they sell which made him think about the use of sand in purifying B.a. A pasty block of spores can be shaken with sand of varying coarseness to achieve very pure or fine spores. IVINS advised that Iraq has very fine sand.

Individuals you may wish to speak with

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

*Daschle*

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 12-08-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/LSC

### Analysis of Sample

Date analyzed - 17 October, 2001

Date of Report - 18 October, 2001

Sample SPS02.57.03

I received the sample (in ziplock bags) from [redacted] on the afternoon of 17 October, 2001. The sample was taken into B-3. Insufficient powder was on the letter, so powdery material was scraped from the envelope and put into a small, tared, glass container. The container was reweighed and the net weight of the powdery material was determined to be [redacted]. To the material was added [redacted] of sterile water for injection to make a total of [redacted] (and approximately [redacted] of suspension. Ten-fold dilutions were plated out onto TSA, then incubated overnight. Plate counts were made, and it was determined that the original tube contained [redacted]. Since there was [redacted] of material, this calculates to be [redacted] of powder material.

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Visual inspection of the suspension of material under phase contrast microscopy found no visible vegetative cells, no visible debris, and very few small clumps. Most of the material appeared to be individual refractile spores.

Interpretations and conclusions: If this is a preparation of bacterial spores, it is an extremely pure preparation, and an extremely high concentration. These are not "garage" spores. The nature of the spore preparation suggests very highly that professional manufacturing techniques were used in the production and purification of the spores, as well as in converting the spores into an extremely fine powder.

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Bruce E. Ivins, Ph.D.  
USAMRIID Bacteriology Division

NY Post

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 12-08-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/LSC

### Analysis of Sample

Date analyzed - 23 October, 2001

Date of Report - 24 October, 2001

Sample\_\_SPS02.88.01\_\_\_\_\_

I received the sample (in a microcentrifuge tube in a ziplock bag) from [redacted] on the afternoon of 23 October, 2001. The tube was weighed, and it was estimated to contain about [redacted] of material. In B-3, [redacted] of sterile water for injection was added to the material. After thorough mixing, the material was transferred to a second tube. The original tube was disinfected with bleach, dried and weighed. The net weight of the granular material was determined to be [redacted]. Ten-fold dilutions were plated out onto TSA, then incubated overnight. Plate counts were made, and it was determined that the original tube contained [redacted]. Since there was [redacted] of material, this calculates to be [redacted] per gram of powder material.

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Visual inspection of the suspension of material under phase contrast microscopy found few (<5%) visible vegetative cells, a small amount (<10%) visible debris, and very few small clumps. Most of the material appeared to be individual refractile spores.

Interpretations and conclusions: If this is a preparation of bacterial spores, it is a relatively pure preparation.. This preparation did not appear as pure as the material (SPS02.57.03) previously examined on October 17, 2001. The SPS02.57.03 preparation contained spores at a concentration of [redacted]. [redacted] The SPS02.57.03 spores were thus approximately [redacted] times "hotter" or more concentrated per gram than the SPS02.88.01 spores examined here.

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Bruce E. Ivins, Ph.D.  
USAMRIID Bacteriology Division

Leahy

# Calculation Form - Spore Concentration in Dry Material

Sample Designation/Description SPS 02.266

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DATE 12-08-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/LSC

Date Analyzed 11 MAR 02

Report Date 12 MAR 02

\*\*\*\*\*

Gross Weight of vial + stopper (or cap) + dry material = \_\_\_\_\_

Tare Weight of vial + stopper (or cap) = \_\_\_\_\_

Net Weight of dry material =

WFI added to vial =

\*\*\*\*\*

## Plate Counts:

10-6 dilution

10-7 dilution

10-8 dilution

10-9 dilution

10-10 dilution Not done

Dilution chosen =  Mean (average) =

CFU/ml in original vial =

CFU/gram in original dry material =

Comments: Powder in freezer vial was slightly off-white or "eggshell" in color. The dry powder stuck to the sides of the freezer vial. After resuspension in WFI, no visual clumps were seen with the unaided eye  looked at the spore suspension under phase contrast microscopy: the spores appeared to be about 99% refractile, with no debris, and some clumping.

Name(s)/date

Bruce E. Shinn 12 Mar 02

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I am a Microbiologist in the USAMRIID Division of Bacteriology. Last fall, I became concerned that the fine powder of the Daschle letter and as well as other potential anthrax letters and samples might not be adequately contained with the practices that were being used here in the Institute. I also was concerned that contamination of personnel might lead to contamination of areas outside the containment suites. Specifically, [redacted] repeatedly had mentioned her concern that she may have been exposed to powder and possibly contaminated. She also repeatedly voiced safety reservations about the way that incoming samples were handled during "Operation Noble Eagle." These concerns and my decisions to perform surveillance cultures and the results of those cultures are accurately described in the attached document entitled "ExSum -18 APR 02, Bruce Ivins." The dates for the cultures taken in April are the 15<sup>th</sup> and 16<sup>th</sup>, as indicated by my corrections. Also, in paragraph 2 of that document, "December of 2002" should read "December of 2001".

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In response to direct questions, I have the following answers:

Q. How was the Daschle letter handled?

A. I worked on this letter with [redacted] was also present in the lab [redacted] when I was working with the powder from this letter. I received the letter from [redacted] in room [redacted]. It had already been used in the sSpecial pPathogens area. It was contained in 2 or 3 ziplocks. I carried it to the passbox in B-3. From the passbox, I took it to the hood in [redacted] opened it, and scraped some of the powder from the envelope and letter into a pre-weighed Wheaton vial. I was surprised at how fine the powder was. It floated around inside the hood like dust in the sunlight. After removing the powder, I wiped off the vial with bleach, put the vial in a 50 ml polypropylene tube and bleached that tube. I then sent the vial out through the passbox into the [redacted] lab for weighing. I showered out of B3, went to the B3 passbox, retrieved the vial and tube, and went to [redacted] lab. At the balance, I removed the vial from the tube and weighed the vial. After weighing, I put the vial back in the polypropylene tube, returned to B-3, put it through the passbox and, once inside B3, took it to the hood in [redacted] again. There, I added water to the powder and did serial dilutions for plate counts. After that, the vial stayed in the lab. I took the letter in the ziplocks, bleached the outside of the ziplocks, and returned the letter in the ziplocks out through the passbox. It was returned to Special Pathogens, but I do not remember if I returned it took or someone else did. I made laboratory notes that contain dates and descriptions. These notes can't be released because they are considered evidence for the Amerithrax Grand Jury Investigation. Later, I also received vials of powder from the New York Post and Leahy and New York Post specimens. These vials The powders were already contained in tubes, and the contents had already been weighed. They came in the same way, through the B3 passbox. I also received some other powdered sample in vials from [redacted] that came in through the passbox, but I do not remember how these samples were packaged.

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Q. Did you tell anyone that you had done the surveillance cultures outside the containment area?

A. I mentioned to [redacted] that I was going to check [redacted] desk in December and told her after I did it that about 1/2 of the cultures were suspicious for anthrax. I didn't keep records or verify the cultures because I was concerned that records might be obtained under the Freedom of Information Act. I was also afraid that reporting would have raised great alarm problems for within the Institute, which at the time was very busy with the processing of samples for Operation Noble Eagle. I personally decontaminated [redacted] desk area, wiping it down with a dilute bleach solution, and gave it little thought until the incident in B3 in April.

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Q. Have you had any concerns about the lab operations that might cause risk to lab personnel?

A. Seeing powder float around in the [redacted] hood raised considerable some concern. In the future, I would not work with dried or powdered spores except in [redacted] conditions. There needs to be more cleaning inside the suites and maybe surveillance. There may be some laxity in Bacteriology, also and, from what I have heard, possibly also in DSD. Most of the workers in Bacteriology are careful, but a few some are somewhat careless, sloppy. Cleaning of B3 is seems to be performed much less than back in the 1980s.

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Q. Is there a regular plan for cleaning? Is the floor cleaned regularly?

A. Not that I know of. I can't remember when the lab floor was last cleaned. We used to do weekly surveillance cultures inside the B3 labs back in the 1980s, but these are almost never done now. Although there is There is supposedly a suite supervisor, but there is not there frequently does not seem to be much



coordination of common suite duties (such as cleaning) [redacted] was the supervisor for many years, but not recently, and was recently renamed B3 supervisor by the Chief of Bacteriology Division.

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Q. Was the intensity of contamination described by [redacted] when she did the surveillance cultures inside the lab after the incident on April 8 heavier than you would find when surveillance cultures used to be done?

A. No. The total intensity of the contamination was greater and also of special concern, since spores were found on the inside passbox latches as well as on shoes and articles of clothing in the "hot" changerooms. We When conducting surveillance in the past, we would sometimes find a few hot spots of contamination and clean them up, then re-check to make sure they were OK.

Q. Did you report your concerns about cleaning to anyone?

A. I have believe that I mentioned it to [redacted] in the past. I've also informally talked with other investigators in the Bacteriology Division about cleaning and cleanliness issues. Usually, In the past, if people people have had specific concerns about suite cleaning or cleanliness, they raised the issues in a general way of cleanliness in general and (as well as the need for improvement) at Division meetings, but no specific individuals were are mentioned at those meetings.

Q. Have there been any other concerns about cleanliness?

A. A few letters came into the Bacteriology Division for analysis during Operation Noble Eagle. The DSD was concerned that at least some one of the samples they had sent to be tested were being was contaminated in room [redacted]

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Q. Who coordinateds the sample processing in room [redacted]

A. [redacted] I also have worked in there. Normally it is a glanders research laboratory.

Q. What live agents comes in and out of the B-3 area?

A. For anthrax aerosol challenges spray, we used to send spores out through the passbox in a hard plastic transport container to be taken to Bldg 1412. Aerosol challenges are done there, dose is confirmed, and data are crunched in 1425. Anthrax AGI samples does not come back as they formerly did several years ago, since the AGI cultures are now done in 1412 by [redacted] and me. Plague AGI may come back.

Q. How are spores prepared?

A. [redacted] have make made spores in room [redacted] Also we use spores prepared at Dugway Proving Ground. Also [redacted] make spores in our laboratory. In [redacted] makes spores. [redacted] I think. Cultures are grown up in shaker flasks. They are often centrifuged in 500 ml tubes bottles in a large (GS-3?GSA or G-3) rotor. The R rotor is too big to take to the hood, so the tubes bottles are usually removed from the rotor in the centrifuge.

Q. Are there any secondary containers in that rotor, like sealed cups?

A. No. Sometimes the tube a bottle breaks and you can hear a slurping sound when the bottletubes are is removed.

Q. Does the centrifuge have a floor hood or other containment system?

A. No. There used to be a system to evacuate the air in the centrifuge through a filter in case there was a break, but that hasn't been used in years.

Q. That wouldn't help if there was a broken tube, would it?

A. No.

Q. Has the ventilation system worked OK as far as you know? Are there magnehelic gauges at the clean room entry?

A. I don't think the suite has ever gone positive. I have never noticed the magnehelic readings in the entry. The gauge between the office area and the hallway are barely negative.

Q. What are the procedures to follow if you have a potential exposure to B. anthracis?

A. That depends on seriousness. If there is a small spill, wipe up area with bleach, cleanup verified by swabs. Individual reports to supervisor. Individuals with possible exposures are evaluated at ward 200. Reports of exposure are supposed to be done within the day.

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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 02/28/2003

On February 21, 2003, BRUCE E. IVINS date of birth 04/22/1946, social security account number 280-44-5449, was interviewed telephonically at his place of employment, the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland, telephone [redacted]. After being advised of the identity of the agent and the purpose of the interview, that being in response to a voice mail left by IVINS for SA [redacted] IVINS provided the following information:

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IVINS obtained a copy of the request form he submitted for a government vehicle to travel to Covance in Denver, Pennsylvania in the fall of 2001. He had also assembled some documents with information about the Dugway spore inventory and what he was working on in the fall of 2001, which was mostly "desk work". IVINS agreed to provide copies of these documents to SA [redacted]

Dugway is supposed to be sending a new batch of purified *Bacillus anthracis* spores to USAMRIID soon, and [redacted] are taking the lead on the project. This Dugway material will be used in work on a new anthrax vaccine.

[redacted] was talking to IVINS about the Dugway material [redacted]. IVINS advised that NSM is an agar medium and he had been under the impression that everyone at USAMRIID used Leighton-Doi broth or blood agar to grow B.a.

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Investigation on 02/21/2003 at Fort Detrick, Maryland (telephonically)  
File # 279A-WF-222936 - 302, 279A-BA-C101392 - 569 - 781 Date dictated N/A  
by SA [redacted]

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SUB BEI # 9

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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 02/28/2003

On February 24, 2003, BRUCE E. IVINS, date of birth 04/22/1946, social security account number 280-44-5449, provided the following materials to SA [redacted] at his place of employment the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland, telephone [redacted]

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A summary of his work activities for the fall of 2001; seven Fort Detrick Dispatch Office requests for vehicle transportation from the fall of 2001; and an inventory of the Dugway *Bacillus anthracis* spore material. These materials are attached herein.

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b7EInvestigation on 02/24/2003 at Fort Detrick, MarylandFile # 279A-WF-222936 [redacted] 302, 279A-BA-C10139 Date dictated N/Aby SA [redacted]

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SUB BEI - #10

Need 3 copies

Fall of 2001 - Bruce Ivins

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Notebooks 3716 and 4383 [ ] - Mouse passive immunization studies -  
1 SEP through 15 OCT

Notebook 4240 - Immunization of rabbits at Covance for antiserum - 18 SEP and  
16 OCT

Notebook 4240 (and computer files) - Preparation of vaccine for FDA  
immunization of mice - September and October

Notebook 4241 - Receipt of 30 vials of rPA from [ ] - 30 SEP

Notebook 4241 (and computer files and other papers) - "New" formaldehyde  
experiment - September into November

Papers and computer files - B00-03, part 5 ( [ ] study: 2 dose efficacy  
in rabbits) - October through December

Meetings? Teleconferences? Protocol reviews? Other "non-lab" work?

# U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases

## Reference Material Receipt Record

Date Received at USAMRIID :

22 Oct 97

Received by:

Bruce Evans  
Bruce E. Evans

Description: Highly purified Ames spores,  $2.3 \times 10^{10}$ /ml, 1000ml total,  
in polycarbonate flasks

USAMRIID Part No.:

1029

Lot No.:

Not Applicable

Supplier:

Dugway Proving Ground  
USAMRIID  
Bacteriology Division

Quantity:

1000ml total

Expiration Date:

31 Dec 2002

Storage:

-8°C in 1% phenol  
B3 cold room in  
Bldg 1425

Vendor:

From B. anthracis Ames  
Strain, Ames, Iowa

Condition:

very good

Intact Container:

Y

N

Temperature upon arrival:

-8°C

Comment:

See USAMRIID Notebook 4010. These spores are highly purified.  
They are >95% unclumped, single, refractile spores.

Reference Material Inventory:

b6  
b7c

Amount In	Amount Used	Date	Balance Left	Unit.
1000 ml	1 ml	9/17/98	999 ml	B2
	1 ml	3/16/99	998 ml	B2
	1 ml	3/23/99	997 ml	B2
	2 ml	5/5/99	995 ml	B2
	1 ml	5/11/99	994 ml	B2
	6 ml	2/22/00	988 ml	B2
	8 ml	3/22/00	980 ml	B2
	75 ml (Bop-03 Part 2)	4/3/00	905 ml	B2
	1 ml	6/29/00	904 ml	B2
	40 ml (Bop-03 Part 2)	7/7/00	864 ml	B2
	40 ml	8/28/00	824 ml	B2
	100 ml	12/4/00	724 ml	B2

challenge

From previous page

Amount In
624ml

Amount In	Amount Used	Date	Balance Left	Init.
624ml	60ml (B00-03 part 3)	6 Apr 01	564ml	B2
564ml	90ml	1 May 01	474ml	B2
474ml	50ml	15 June 01	424ml	B2
424	50ml (B00-03 part 4)	9 July 01	374ml	B2
374ml	5ml	27 Aug 01	369ml	B2
369ml	10ml	4 Oct 01	359ml	B2
359ml	12ml	2 Nov 01	347ml <sup>358</sup>	B2
347ml <sup>358</sup>			358ml	B2
358ml	1ml	14 Nov 01	357ml	B2
357ml	10ml	15 Nov 01	347ml	B2
347ml	40ml (B00-03 part 5)	10 Dec 01	307ml	B2
307ml	8ml	21 Dec 01	299ml	B2
299ml	2ml (B00-03 part 6)	14 Jan 02	278ml	B2
278ml	1.2ml (Sporocidin test)	18 Mar 02	277ml	B2
277ml	15ml	2 Apr 02	262ml	B2
262ml	20ml	22 Jul 02	242ml	B2
242ml	50ml	5 Aug 02	192ml	B2
192ml	35ml (B00-03 part 7)	17/19 Sep 02	157ml	B2
157ml	3ml	1 Nov 02	154ml	B2
154ml	50ml	30 Nov 02 <sup>92</sup>	104ml	B2
		29 Nov 02		
104ml	26ml (B00-03 part 8)	18 Feb 03	78ml	B2
78ml				



- 1 -

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 03/07/2003

On March 3, 2003, BRUCE E. IVINS, date of birth 04/22/1946, social security account number 280-44-5449, was interviewed at his place of employment, the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland, telephone [REDACTED]. After being advised of the identity of the agents and the purpose of the interview, IVINS provided the following information:

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IVINS provided the agents with a list of individuals that the agents might want to contact as well as hard copies of emails between IVINS [REDACTED] for IVINS to determine the spore concentration of the B.a. in the Daschle letter. These materials are attached herein.

[REDACTED] contacted IVINS and asked him to get a hold of the Daschle letter and determine the spore concentration. IVINS does not recall whether [REDACTED] told him to ask [REDACTED] for access to the Daschle letter or if [REDACTED] called the [REDACTED] and requested that IVINS be given access. [REDACTED] may recall how [REDACTED] advised IVINS to obtain the Daschle letter. [REDACTED] may remember whether it was [REDACTED] who called and asked [REDACTED] to give the Daschle letter to IVINS to process.

IVINS did not initially know that [REDACTED] had custody of the Daschle letter. He advised that even if [REDACTED] had told him to "go get the letter", IVINS would not have known to go to [REDACTED] to obtain it. IVINS further advised that even if he had known that [REDACTED] was in custody of the letter and he had requested access to it without some kind of authorization, she probably would not have given it to him.

[REDACTED] did not specify that IVINS should do the concentration determination in Suite B3. IVINS [REDACTED] picked up the Daschle letter from [REDACTED] and took the Daschle letter to IVINS' lab space in B3 to do what [REDACTED] had requested. In retrospect, IVINS thinks that they should have processed the Daschle letter in a glovebox rather than a hood, however [REDACTED] was not a glovebox in B3.

b2  
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Investigation on 03/03/2003 at Fort Detrick, Maryland

File # 279A-WF-USAMRIID-302-279A-BA-C101392-321 Date dictated N/A

by SA [REDACTED]

BEI - #11

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279A-WF-222936-302; 279A-BA-C10139; 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of BRUCE E. IVINS, On 03/03/2003, Page 2

IVINS gave copies of the Daschle B.a. concentration data sheet to [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] IVINS does not recall bringing the Daschle concentration data to [REDACTED] IVINS knows that [REDACTED] is aware that the Daschle letter went into B3 because he brought [REDACTED] the data sheet. IVINS presumes that [REDACTED] would know that the Daschle letter was in B3 since [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] would also have known that the Daschle letter went into B3, as [REDACTED] knew that B3 was where IVINS had his lab space.

During the fall of 2001, some DSD personnel had to be placed on Cipro as a precaution. This was not because the Daschle letter was processed in B3. IVINS advised that the "scuttlebutt" was that it was because of mishandling of material by DSD. If DSD did mess up with regard to safety, the most that could happen to [REDACTED] would be a slap on the hand. On the other hand, the same mistake could affect [REDACTED]

IVINS does not think that he should have been given the Daschle letter contained only in ziplocs, rather it should have been overpacked in a can. He does not think that the letter should have ever been in [REDACTED] since it is a Biosafety Level (BL) 2 area. He also found out after the fact that it should not have been processed in B3.

[REDACTED] received a "huge" Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for the handling of future evidence, and then [REDACTED] said that no evidence was to be taken into B3, [REDACTED] or the Bacteriology Division in general.

What [REDACTED] told IVINS about [REDACTED] [REDACTED] prompted him to conduct his independent swabbing project. [REDACTED] said that the way the letters were being handled was terrible. IVINS advised that the hot spots found in B3 during the swabbing may have been contamination from the Daschle letter.

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b7C

Additional individuals you may wish to interview

b6  
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- 1 -

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 04/17/2003

On April 15, 2003, BRUCE E. IVINS, date of birth 04/22/1946, social security account number 280-44-5449, was interviewed telephonically at his place of employment, the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland, telephone [redacted]. After being advised of the identity of the agent and the purpose of the interview, IVINS provided the following information:

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IVINS keeps his samples in cryotubes in 5"x 5"x 0.5" freezer boxes. He does not recall having any larger Sterilite boxes in the lab.

IVINS recalled [redacted]

The only lyophilizer at USAMRIID that IVINS had any knowledge of is located in Suite B5. This lyophilizer is a Virtis and it went straight to Suite B5 after it was received at USAMRIID. It has never been outside of Biosafety Level (BSL) 2 lab space. IVINS used this lyophilizer to make MPL PA vaccine. This vaccine is made from a detoxified product from Gram negative bacteria and is used as a non-specific immunity booster. It does not offer protection against any particular disease, and it can be added to any vaccine. He has not used this lyophilizer since the mid 1990s.

Anyone in the Bacteriology Division would have access to this lyophilizer, as well as anyone with access to Suite B5. At one time, access to Suite B5 could also be gained via the crash door. There is a combination lock on the Suite B5 door, but IVINS did not know when that lock was installed. Prior to the combination lock, there was a key lock on the door which only worked some of the time. IVINS has never seen [redacted] let alone near the Suite B5 lyophilizer. There is an additional lyophilizer in Building 1412, Room [redacted] that [redacted]

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b7Eb6  
b7CInvestigation on 04/15/2003 at Washington, DC (telephonically)

279A-BA-C101392

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 279A-WF-222936-202 Date dictated N/A

by SA [redacted]

BEI-12

Y/N

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b7C  
b7E

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of BRUCE E. IVINS, On 04/15/2003, Page 2

[ ] has knowledge of. It was turned in approximately three years ago for a new lyophilizer.

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For aerosol challenges, the stocks of *Bacillus anthracis* (B.a.) are kept in Suite B3. Dilutions are made and kept in large glass bottles. These bottles are placed in bags and then a transport can. They are transported to the Building 1412 airlock and placed in the refrigerator one to three days prior to the spray. The pre-challenge inoculum incubates overnight in Room [ ]

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On the day of the challenge, the B.a. spores are heat shocked at [ ] cooled in ice, and placed in 9-10 mL tubes. One tube per animal is prepared. The [ ] dilution is plated using Tryptic Soy Agar (TSA) from the Tissue Culture Group.

As the challenge runs, the all glass impinger (AGI) water samples are collected after each run and given to IVINS to be plated. The colonies are counted the next day to determine the difference between the pre-challenge concentration and the dose that each animal actually received.

The used agar plates are placed in a bag and autoclaved a few days later along with the rest of the spray trash. If a spray is conducted on a Tuesday or Wednesday, the plates are read the following day or two and clean up is on Friday. If it was a very busy week, clean up might wait until Monday.

Plates, paper, and trash to be autoclaved are placed in a tidy sack, which is a large, extra thick paper bag. The individual's name and where the trash is from are noted on the sack and it is brought to the basement where the animal caretakers autoclave it. IVINS does not know how long the bag sits in the basement prior to being autoclaved.

After a certain amount of time has passed after being plated, B.a. colonies would no longer be able to be counted. After five to seven days, B.a. spores would form on any nutritional agar medium. Once the spores have formed, they are viable for a long time. There are still viable spores on the original B.a. Ames slant from Texas when it was last checked for the repository. Spores do not need nutrients because they are inert.

Agar grown B.a. spores are almost always clumpier and dirtier and are not as high quality as broth grown spores.

- 1 -

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 04/17/2003

On April 17, 2003, BRUCE E. IVINS, date of birth 04/22/1946, social security account number 280-44-5449, was interviewed telephonically at his place of employment, the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland, telephone [REDACTED]. After being advised of the identity of the agent and the purpose of the interview, IVINS provided the following information:

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IVINS recalled details about the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] He advised that most of the same people attend Bacteriology Division parties, and therefore the guest list for each party is difficult to recall.

IVINS feels badly because his work could have played a role in the anthrax mailings. Someone could have read his research and determined that *Bacillus anthracis* (B.a.) Ames was vaccine resistant.

After his telephonic conversation with SA [REDACTED] on 04/15/2003, IVINS feels sick over the fact that the material used in the anthrax mailings could have come from a stock made from the B.a. aerosol challenge trash.

Investigation on 04/17/2003 at Washington, DC (telephonically)

279A-BA-C101392

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 279A-WF-222936-30 Date dictated N/A

by SA [REDACTED]

b6  
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- 1 -

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 08/15/2003

On August 15, 2003, SA [ ] entered the Biological Containment Suite, numbered B3, at the U.S. ARMY MEDICAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF INFECTIOUS DISEASES (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland with BRUCE E. IVINS a research scientist from the Bacteriology Division of USAMRIID. IVINS presented SA [ ] with an agar slant labeled, "AMES 255414B B. anthracis" and a cardboard shipping container postmarked February 18, 1981, originating from, [ ] Texas A&M Vet. Med. Diag. Lab., P.O. Box [ ] Amarillo, Texas 79106" to [ ] Dept. of the Army U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, Fort Detrick, Frederick, Maryland 21701".

b6  
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SA [ ] placed each item into individual ziploc-type bags, sealed them, and wiped their exteriors with a bleach solution before placing each of them into a second ziploc-type bag. The outer ziploc-type bags were wiped with a bleach solution and placed together inside another ziploc-type bag. The outer ziploc-type bag was wiped with a bleach solution and placed in a turned-out biohazard bag inside a transport container on the cold side of the B3 airlock. From the hot-side of suite B3, SA [ ] observed, through the window of the airlock, as [ ] accompanied by Hazardous Materials Response Unit, Hazardous Materials Officer [ ] opened the airlock from the cold side, closed the biohazard bag into the transport container, sprayed a bleach solution around the rim of the container, sealed the container, wiped off its exterior with a bleach solution, and passed the container to [ ]

At this point SA [ ] showered out of suite B3 and escorted [ ] and [ ] to building [ ] where the FBI Ames Repository (FBIR) is housed. SA [ ] took the transport container and secured it in the FBIR refrigerator in room [ ] of building [ ]. The transfer of evidence was documented with a "Receipt of Property", FD-597, which is stored in the FD-340 section of the file.

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S: [ ] 302

SUB 302-352


Investigation on 08/15/2003 at Fort Detrick, MarylandFile # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID - 202 Date dictated 08/15/2003

by SA [ ]

b6  
b7C

SUB 302-352

BACK OF PAGE 116



11/28/03

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- 1 -

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 10/02/2003



BRUCE IVINS, white male, approximately 40 years of age, Scientist, United States Army Medical Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), 1425 Porter Street, Fort Detrick, Frederick, Maryland 21702 was advised of the identity of the Special Agent (SA) and the nature of the interview. IVINS provided the following information:

IVINS identified several preparations of *Bacillus anthracis* (BA) Ames strain which the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) may want to add to the "Ames Repository". IVINS also clarified the history of the samples of Ames BA that IVINS [redacted] submitted to the Repository during April, 2002.

b6  
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IVINS listed his Ames samples as follows:

- 1) Original 1981 slant from Texas, 255414B
- 2) 7800a
- 3) 7800b
- 4) 7737
- 5) 1030 Reference Material
- 6) 7739a
- 7) 7739b
- 8) 7739c

b2  
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The last four samples listed above are spore preparations which were produced by various individuals at USAMRIID. Reference Material 1030 is a multiple batch lot of spores produced by IVINS [redacted] from 11/20/1995 to 11/18/1996. [redacted] produced lot 7739a on 07/25/1997. [redacted] produced lots 7739b and 7739c on 12/08/1999 and 03/28/2001, respectively. IVINS will save the above four spore preparations for future submission to the Repository. IVINS also had two additional preparations of Ames BA spores, lots 7736 and 7738, but the spores were used and are no longer available.

b6  
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The first four samples of Ames listed above were submitted to the Repository by [redacted] during April, 2002. The 7800 a and b samples are from IVINS [redacted] respectively. 7800a is a sample of IVINS' Ames stock and was prepared from a single colony of the original Ames slant by IVINS in 1985. 7800b is a sample from the

Investigation on 08/13/2003 at Frederick, MD

File # 279A-WF-222936 SUB 302-3921 Date dictated 08/20/2003

by SA [redacted] BEI-15

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IVINS2. [redacted]



279A-WF-222936 SUB 302

Continuation of FD-302 of Bruce Ivins, On 08/13/2003, Page 2

BA collection of PERRY MIKESELL, dated July, 1991, and labeled [REDACTED] IVINS believes that the MIKESELL sample was derived from [REDACTED] stock culture around 1985. The sample labeled [REDACTED] and submitted to the Repository in April, 2002 may be from MIKESELL's collection and not directly from [REDACTED] stocks of BA. [REDACTED] submitted IVINS' samples to the Repository and would be able to provide information on the origin of the [REDACTED] sample in the Repository. [REDACTED] is now employed by [REDACTED]

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IVINS began work at USAMRIID in the early 1980s. When IVINS arrived, the scientists who worked on BA cultured BA, or "sub-cultured" BA by taking an inoculation loop, scraping the loop across a plate of multiple BA colonies, and then using the scraped loop to inoculate a fresh culture for BA growth. IVINS was surprised at this method of inoculation. Before beginning work at USAMRIID, IVINS sub-cultured bacteria by using an inoculation loop to "pick" a single colony of bacteria, instead of taking multiple bacterial colonies as done at USAMRIID. The single colony method was used by many scientists so that sub-culturing would not lead to genetic diversity in growing cultures of bacteria. The multiple colony sub-culturing method used at USAMRIID was recommended by [REDACTED] a respected scientist in the BA field. In 1983 and 1984, the two plasmids present in BA were discovered, and IVINS then reverted to the single colony method of subculturing. Further, when IVINS reverted to the single colony method, IVINS also used the original 1981 agar slant of the Ames BA and started a fresh culture of Ames to use in his, IVINS, research.

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IVINS noted that MIKESELL moved to Ohio several years ago and no longer worked at USAMRIID. MIKESELL was considered an alcoholic while MIKESELL worked at USAMRIID, due to MIKESELL drinking a lot of hard liquor. MIKESELL died last year and IVINS attributed MIKESELL's death to excessive drinking, lack of exercise, and a poor life style. Individuals who worked with MIKESELL at USAMRIID were, [REDACTED] last name unknown (LNU), [REDACTED] (phonetic), and [REDACTED] (phonetic).

- 1 -

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 10/03/2003

BRUCE IVINS, white male, approximately 40 years of age, Scientist, United States Army Medical Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), 1425 Porter Street, Fort Detrick, Frederick, Maryland 21702 was advised of the identity of the Special Agent (SA) and the nature of the interview. IVINS provided the following information via facsimile:

IVINS provided copies of 17 pages from IVINS' laboratory notebooks and a one page typewritten note.

IVINS made several *Bacillus anthracis* (BA) spore preparations in the 1980s. In May, 1987 and June, 1987, [redacted] and BRUCE IVINS made spore preparations on sheep blood agar, as well as Leighton and Doi medium. The June, 1987 preparation was made using BA from the original 1981 agar slant of Ames strain BA. In December, 1989 IVINS made spores on sheep blood agar as well as Leighton and Doi medium using the original 1981 Ames slant.

IVINS and [redacted] made several spore preparations during the mid-1980s, in addition to the spore preparations listed above.

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Investigation on 09/05/2003 at Washington, D.C. (via facsimile)

File # 279A-WF-222936 SUB 302-3920 Date dictated 09/12/2003

by [redacted] BEI -11pb6  
b7C

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Ivins 3. [redacted]

- 1 -

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 12/03/2003

BRUCE IVINS, white male, approximately 40 years of age, Scientist, United States Army Medical Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), 1425 Porter Street, Fort Detrick, Frederick, Maryland 21702, [redacted] was advised of the identity of the Special Agent (SA) and the nature of the interview. IVINS provided the following information telephonically:

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IVINS stores his *Bacillus anthracis* (BA) strains and seed stocks in a freezer located in Building 1425 at USAMRIID. IVINS' freezer belongs to the Bacteriology Division at USAMRIID and is located in a Bio-Safety Level 3 (BSL-3) laboratory in Building 1425. [redacted] and IVINS share the same BSL-3 laboratory, but [redacted] uses a different freezer than IVINS.

IVINS' freezer is also a different freezer than the freezer which is used by [redacted]. The freezer that [redacted] uses to store BA strains and stocks is located in Building 1412 at USAMRIID. The BA Ames isolate that [redacted] uses in her work and stores in Building [redacted] is designated [redacted].

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Stored in IVINS' freezer in Building 1425 is a box of BA strains and isolates originally belonging to [redacted] as well as a box of BA strains and isolates originally belonging to PERRY MIKESELL. The BA isolate designated as [redacted] which IVINS' maintains is not the [redacted] BA Ames isolate.

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IVINS would maintain both the [redacted] and MIKESELL boxes of BA in his, IVINS', freezer until contacted by the SA.

Ivins4 [redacted]

Notes of Interview Can be  
Found in 1A BAG 4294

Investigation on 9/03/2003 at Washington, D.C. (telephonically)File # 279A-WF-222936 SUB 302-3981 Date dictated 9/12/2003

by SA [redacted] BEI 17

b6  
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- 1 -

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 10/22/2003b6  
b7C

On 10/21/2003, Special Agent [redacted] along with [redacted] entered the Federal Bureau of Investigation's *Bacillus anthracis* Ames Repository (FBIR) in building [redacted] of the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) in Fort Detrick, Maryland, to enter samples and sample information into the FBIR and FBIR database. Bruce R. Ivins from the Bacteriology Division of USAMRIID submitted four (4) duplicate samples for a total of eight (8) slants to the FBIR. The slants were arranged in matching pairs and each slant was assigned an FBIR number in sequential order. The odd numbered slants were immediately shipped overnight to [redacted] the Northern Arizona University, Flagstaff, Arizona. The even numbered slants were harvested into liquid media containing glycerol, and frozen at -70°C in the FBIR freezer.

Copies of the shipping documents were submitted to the 1A section of the file.

[redacted]


Investigation on 10/21/2003 at Fort Detrick, Maryland

File # 279A-WF0222936-USAMRIID-264 Date dictated 10/22/2003

by SA [redacted]

BEI - 18

BACK OF PAGE 129



b2  
b6  
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- 1 -

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 12/12/2003

BRUCE EDWARDS IVINS, Ph.D., white male, DOB 4/22/46, SS# 280-44-5449, U.S. ARMY MEDICAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF INFECTIOUS DISEASES (USAMRIID), Ft. Detrick, MD, telephone [redacted] was interviewed at his place of employment, USAMRIID, by Special Agents [redacted]. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agents and the purpose of the interview, IVINS provided the following information:

In response to the subpoena issued by the FBI in 2002, [redacted] searched the freezer in B3. IVINS believes [redacted] prepared the four samples of *Bacillus anthracis* (Ba) Ames strain that were found during the freezer search and submitted the samples to the FBI Repository (FBIR) in April 2002. IVINS provided the following labels and descriptions for each of the four samples:

- 1) "Original slant Ames spores - 1981"- This is the original sample sent from Texas, which was Ba Ames strain isolated from a cow.
- 2) "7800a - Primary subculture from original slant- 1985- Bruce Ivins"- This is a subculture that IVINS made in 1985 from the original 1981 slant.
- 3) "7800b - [redacted] Ames strain from 1985 - Multiple Passages"- This is from [redacted] collection. IVINS is unsure how this sample was made.
- 4) "7737 - Dugway Ames spores- 1997"- This is Ba Ames spores sent from DUGWAY PROVING GROUNDS for use in aerosol challenges. This material was used as the reference lot. Originally [redacted] purified spores were sent. The spores were stored in two 500 mL flasks. IVINS has approximately 100 mL left of this sample.

IVINS believes that tissue samples, possibly a spleen, were also sent from the cow from which the Ames strain was originally isolated. IVINS does not know where the tissue samples would be stored. [redacted] would be able to provide more information regarding additional tissue samples from the cow.

Investigation on 12/12/03 at Fort Detrick, MD

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID-499 Date dictated \_\_\_\_\_

by SA [redacted]

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279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of BRUCE EDWARDS IVINS, On 12/12/03, Page 2

[redacted] and IVINS searched the B3 freezer again and found four more Ba Ames samples (labeled [redacted] descriptions to follow), a box of samples labeled with [redacted] name, and a box of samples labeled with PERRY MIKESELL'S name (true name may be OLIVER). MIKESELL's box does contain Ba Ames strain, but IVINS does not know if somebody else has already submitted this sample to the FBIR. These are not samples that anybody was trying to hide. MIKESELL left USAMRIID in the early to mid 1990's. MIKESELL's laboratory notebooks are in IVINS' office. [redacted] notebooks should be in the library at USAMRIID. The library usually discards notebooks after 20 years.

b6  
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b2  
b7F

IVINS provided the four samples of Ba Ames strain (labeled Reference Material 1030, 7739 a,b,c) to the FBI repository in October 2003. IVINS provided Agents with a typewritten description of the 4 samples (The description summary will be submitted to the 1A section of the subfile). IVINS provided the following labels and descriptions for each of the four samples:

1) "Reference Material 1030" is comprised of Ba Ames strain spores produced by IVINS [redacted] on 13 different days: 20 Nov 95, 14 Dec 95, 8 Jan 96, 22 Jan 96, 8 Feb 96, 12 Feb 96, 16 Feb 96, 19 Feb 96, 18 Mar 96, 25 Mar 96, 1 Apr 96, 15 Apr 96, 18 Nov 96. Batches of spores produced on the aforementioned dates were made in Leighton and Doi medium and purified on Renografin-76 gradients. This was found in the B-3 cold room (Room [redacted], a 4-8 degree Celsius cooler. These spores are the leftovers from aerosol challenges. The sample is stored in water and 1% phenol.

2) 7739a was produced by [redacted] - The spores produced were made in Leighton and Doi media. IVINS reviewed [redacted] notebook for a description of how 7739a was made. [redacted] wrote in the notebook that she obtained the inoculum used to grow up 7739a from a freezer tube in the freezer. No other details were listed.

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3) 7739b was produced by [redacted] on 12/8/1999. The spores produced were made in Leighton and Doi media. No details are known about the inoculum and methods used.

4) 7739c was produced by [redacted] on 3/28/2001. The spores produced were made in Leighton and Doi media. No details are known about the inoculum and methods used.



279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of BRUCE EDWARDS IVINS, On 12/12/03, Page 3

[redacted] would be able to provide more information regarding the inoculum and production method used to make [redacted]

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IVINS stored these 4 strains of Ba in the B3 walk-in cold [redacted] was described as a freezer room, which has a bench and 2 shelves along the walls. Samples are stored on the floor, the benches, and the shelves in the cold room. Anybody who has access to B3 or B4 has access to [redacted] People who had access to [redacted] include, but are not limited to: [redacted]

b6  
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b2  
b7F

[redacted] technician (unknown name). Since B-3 and B-4 are connected, anybody who had access to B-4 had access to B-3, which includes: [redacted] FNU (First Name Unknown) [redacted]

IVINS also had samples labeled 7736 and 7738, however, the entire sample has been exhausted. Therefore, he did not provide the FBIR a sample of 7736 and 7738. Sample 7738 was a dilution of 7737.

A Ba Ames strain spore age time line is as follows :  
(Oldest spores) Original slant 1981, sample #7800, sample #1030, sample #7739 (Youngest spores)

[redacted] has the sample labeled [redacted] and it is being stored in [redacted] and [redacted] should know the history of sample [redacted] (writer believes to be [redacted]) was working at USAMRIID with [redacted] and then left to [redacted] IVINS believes that [redacted] worked on the Ames strain at [redacted] IVINS believes that [redacted] at [redacted] sent [redacted] around 1994-1997 to [redacted] at USAMRIID to conduct a strain study. [redacted] did not find out until later that [redacted] was Ames. IVINS found out that [redacted] was the Ames strain around 2000-2002. Before that IVINS just knew the strain by its label, [redacted]

[redacted] (writer believes to be [redacted]) may have worked with [redacted] as part of his research project looking at antibiotic resistance in different strains of Ba.

IVINS is not familiar with the "Ames-Arkansas-Buffalo" sample. IVINS does not know if samples labeled "Buffalo" (named after the animal, not the city), "Texas", or "Arkansas", were ever

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of BRUCE EDWARDS IVINS, On 12/12/03, Page 4

typed by [ ] group at [ ] IVINS does not know if samples collected from Zimbabwe, Turkey, or Namibia, were typed. IVINS provided agents with a list of strains that were typed (This list will be submitted to the 1A section of the subfile). Colonel [ ] isolated the Ba sample that he called Texas 2 from sheep liver. [ ] traveled all around the country to different laboratories collecting different strains of Ba.

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IVINS read in [ ] paper that Ames and New Hampshire strains of Ba are considered to be hotter than the other strains.

The samples that [ ] brought from home in a paint can and then returned to USAMRIID are kept in the cold room, [ ]

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[ ] and [ ] worked for MIKESELL. [ ] will have their contact information and would be able to provide more information regarding their research and samples.

b6  
b7C

[ ] worked with [ ] he is a [ ] who worked for about [ ] in the [ ] at USAMRIID. IVINS does not know where [ ] is working now. [ ] worked with MIKESELL, [ ] There was some friction between MIKESELL (Masters Degree) and [ ] (Doctoral Degree) because of their degree levels. IVINS distrusted [ ] and questioned his scientific integrity. Many other people at USAMRIID, including [ ] felt the same way towards [ ]

When [ ] left USAMRIID he took [ ] IVINS does not know if [ ] took Ba Ames strain from USAMRIID, but [ ] did have access to Ba, since he used to [ ] in the B4 suite. [ ] shared Delta Sterne, Delta Ames, Delta Vollum, all of which were heat cured of the toxin plasmid with [ ] (Writer knows [ ] to be a [ ] in [ ] told [ ] that he made the Ba himself, although he did not make them himself. [ ] is currently working on Anthrax research at the [ ]

IVINS did not hear of a shipment sent to [ ] in Russia. There were strains sent to Russia as part of an exchange

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of BRUCE EDWARDS IVINS, On 12/12/03, Page 5

program. IVINS provided Agents with documents showing the request for shipment, the import permit, and the shipping papers (These documents will be included in the 1A section of the file).

USAMRIID sent Russian Scientist, [redacted] (Address listed on shipping documents: [redacted]

[redacted] Russia), strains [redacted] is the strain that BioPort uses for making the anthrax vaccine. [redacted] is similar to the Sterne strain and is not a derivative of the Ames strain. The shipment request date was September 18, 2000. Delta Ames strain is the Ames strain which has been cured of the toxin plasmid. [redacted] generated the "H" or "H\*" (H star) strain, which was thought to be a vaccine resistant virulent strain of Ba. [redacted] said that Ba Ames strains with the capsule plasmid only (cured of toxin plasmid) are still on the select agent list because of research that has demonstrated the ability to transfer plasmids back into cured strains, thus producing a virulent strain from an avirulent strain.

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b7C

[redacted] can return the capsule plasmid to Ba ANR strain, but doesn't know if the toxin plasmid (the larger plasmid) can be returned to a toxin cured strain.

[redacted] scientist visiting USAMRIID from approximately [redacted] was working in the bacteriology division conducting research on Ba Ames strain. [redacted] had access to the BSL 3 suites. [redacted] another [redacted] scientist, was also working at USAMRIID in the bacteriology division and had access to the [redacted] in the BSL 2 suites. IVINS is unsure of what [redacted] was working on and if [redacted] had access to the hot suites. IVINS described [redacted] as an odd character, the type of person who would "kill his parents and ask the jury for mercy because he's an orphan". [redacted] worked with [redacted]

b6  
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b7D

In late 2000 Israel asked USAMRIID through [redacted] to ship Ba Ames strain to an [redacted] laboratory. During the time period of 10/16/2000 to 11/13/2000, there was email traffic between [redacted] IVINS, [redacted] regarding the shipment. At the request of [redacted] IVINS requested permission to ship Ba Ames strain to [redacted]. The request was discontinued when the DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE asked questions regarding the shipment and the sample amount. The request was reopened on 2/22/2001 and IVINS completed the necessary paperwork. However, [redacted] at the

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of BRUCE EDWARDS IVINS, On 12/12/03, Page 6

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE denied the request. [ ] had been really pushing for the shipment to [ ] IVINS believes it is possible to have taken a sample of Ba Ames strain back to [ ] without anybody knowing it.

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b7D

IVINS has worked on a research project with [ ] The research included inserting the protective antigen (PA) into *E.coli*, transferring the PA into *Bacillus subtilis* (Bs), transferring the PA into non-sporulating Delta Sterne strain which is cured of the toxin plasmid (Delta Sterne [ ] and then using this strain to create a vaccine. IVINS has samples of the original Bs stain and the Bs containing PA).

b6  
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Many USAMRIID Ba researchers are no longer working at USAMRIID. These researchers may have had some samples remaining when they left employment at USAMRIID and did not name anyone "in charge" of the samples. IVINS provided the names of the following researchers who may have left samples behind:

[ ] may have [ ] samples)

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PERRY MIKESELL

[ ] worked with [ ]  
[ ] may have [ ] samples)  
[ ] may have [ ] samples)

IVINS agreed to allow Agent [ ] accompany him into the biological containment suite B3 located in building 1425 to locate Ba Ames samples discussed during the interview and to look for additional samples of Ba. Results are included in a separate FD-302.

The following is a list of the documents IVINS provided to the Agents that will be submitted to the 1A section of the file:

- 1) A typewritten description of the 4 samples found in the B3 freezer that IVINS submitted to the FBIR in October 2003.

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Continuation of FD-302 of BRUCE EDWARDS IVINS, On 12/12/03, Page 7

b6  
b7C

- 2) A list of Ba strains that have been typed by [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]
- 3) Ba Shipment request from Israel, email traffic regarding shipment, letter from the Department of Commerce denying request.
- 4) Ba Shipment request from Russia, import permits, shipping receipt.
- 5) Multiple Ba strain inventories, including the Select Agent Registry created by the Safety Office at USAMRIID and the Strain Report created for the Medical Research and Development Board, which lists IVINS collection.
- 6) 2 Ba strain lists of Perry Mikesell's Ba collection
- 7) Application for registration of Etiologic Agents to USAMRIID's safety office for [REDACTED] IVINS
- 8) Emails regarding request to find out if USAMRIID made dried, powdered anthrax Ba spores

- 1 -

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 12/15/2003

On 12/12/2003, SA [ ] accompanied BRUCE E. IVINS, of the Bacteriology Division of the U.S. ARMY MEDICAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF INFECTIOUS DISEASES (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland into biological containment suite [ ] of building [ ]. From a refrigerator located in room [ ] of suite [ ] IVINS showed SA [ ] the following samples:

b6  
b7C  
b2  
b7E

P142

b6  
b7C

USAMRIID Sample #	Container	Approximate Volume
1030	50mL Falcon tube	
7739a	50mL Falcon tube	
7739b	50mL Falcon tube	
7739c	50mL Falcon tube	
462	50mL Falcon tube	

From a walk-in cold room (Room [ ], IVINS disclosed a one (1) liter flask containing approximately 50mL of USAMRIID Sample #7737.


b2  
b7E

From a -70 degree Celsius freezer located in the hallway of suite, [ ] IVINS showed SA [ ] the following samples:

Sample description	Container	Approximate Volume
Six (6) tubes labeled Ames	Box labeled [ ]	
Nine (9) tubes labeled Ames "7800"	Box labeled Ivins Box #2	
Eighteen (18) tubes	Box labeled Ames spores from [ ] from [ ] orig. Ames slant diluted in [ ] and [ ] to about [ ]	

b6  
b7C  
b2  
b7Eb6  
b7CInvestigation on 12/12/2003 at Fort Detrick, MarylandFile # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID 471 Date dictated 12/15/2003by SA [ ] BEI-20

BACK OF PAGE 147



b2  
b6  
b7C  
b7E

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Continuation of FD-302 of Bruce E. Ivins, On 12/12/2003, Page 2

Sample description	Container	Approximate Volume
Five (5) tubes labeled [redacted]	Box labeled Mikesell	Not noted
One (1) tube labeled Ames FTD 1004	White plastic Nalgene box labeled Mikesell	Not noted
One (1), fifteen (15) mL Falcon tube labeled Ames SP	Styrofoam rack	Not noted
One (1) tube labeled Ames BA 1004 9-24-92 DT	Box labeled BA stock cultures 1a	Not noted
One (1) tube labeled Ames BA 1004 3-4-92	Box labeled "b" box stock cultures	Not noted
One (1), fifteen (15) mL Falcon tube labeled [redacted] Ames 11/1/00	250mL Beaker	[redacted]
One (1), fifteen (15) mL Falcon tube labeled [redacted] Ames 11/1/00	250mL Beaker	

b2  
b7F

"10^" denotes exponential notation

IVINS also presented nine (9) tubes labeled [redacted] of Ames from a box labeled [redacted]. There were several other boxes with the names [redacted]. [redacted] gave permission to look in the boxes labeled with [redacted] and his names.

b6  
b7C  
b2  
b7F

In the box labeled Ames and Sterne [redacted] there were twelve (12) tubes labeled Ames 2/11/99 containing approximately 1mL of material.



279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

b6  
b7C  
b2  
b7FContinuation of FD-302 of Bruce E. Ivins, On 12/12/2003, Page 3In the walk-in refrigerator (Room  SA   
observed the following samples:

Sample Description	Container	Approximate Volume
One (1), fifteen (15) mL Falcon tube labeled Ames stock 2 <input type="text"/>	Box described by Ivins as containing <input type="text"/> samples	Not noted
One (1), fifteen (15) mL Falcon tube labeled Ames spores <input type="text"/>	Box described by Ivins as containing <input type="text"/> samples	<input type="text"/>
One (1), 1.5mL eppendorf labeled Ames <input type="text"/>	Styrofoam eppendorf rack	Not noted
One (1), 1.5mL eppendorf labeled Ames <input type="text"/>	Styrofoam eppendorf rack	Not noted
One (1), 1.5mL eppendorf labeled Ames <input type="text"/>	Styrofoam eppendorf rack	Not noted
One (1), 1.5mL eppendorf labeled Ames <input type="text"/>	Styrofoam eppendorf rack	Not noted
Two (2), 20mL glass tubes labeled Ames <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	Tube rack	Not noted



- 1 -


## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 05/4/2005

On 12/12/2003, BRUCE IVINS, scientist at the U.S. ARMY MEDICAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF INFECTIOUS DISEASES, provided Special Agents [redacted] laboratory notebooks that he had in his possession. On 04/19/2004, SA [redacted] transferred possession of the above numbered original notebooks to SSA [redacted]. Photocopies of the original notebooks were made. SSA [redacted] returned the originals notebooks to IVINS. The photocopies of the notebooks were placed in an FD-340 and will be submitted to the 1A section of the file. The laboratory notebooks numbers are as follows:

b6  
b7C

3921  
3655  
3945  
3209  
3545  
4383  
4037  
3270  
3303  
3472  
3302  
3716  
4000  
4282  
4010

Investigation on 05/4/2004 at Falls Church, VAFile # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID-1230 Date dictated \_\_\_\_\_by SA [redacted] BEI-21b6  
b7C

- 1 -

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 05/7/2004

On 12/12/2003, BRUCE IVINS, scientist at the U.S. ARMY  
MEDICAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF INFECTIOUS DISEASES, provided  
Special Agents [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] laboratory notebooks that he had in his possession.  
The laboratory notebooks numbers are as follows:

b6  
b7C

3921  
3655  
3945  
3209  
3545  
4383  
4037  
3270  
3303  
3472  
3302  
3716  
4000  
4282  
4010

On 04/19/2004, SA [REDACTED] transferred  
possession of the above numbered notebooks to SSA [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] SA [REDACTED] delivered the notebooks to SSA  
[REDACTED] at the request of SA [REDACTED] on 04/19/2004.

b6  
b7CInvestigation on 05/7/2004 at Quantico, VAFile # 279A-WF-222936-USA MRIID - 714

Date dictated \_\_\_\_\_

by SA [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] *BEI - 22*b6  
b7C

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/LSC  
ON 12-08-2008

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE

Date: 01/07/2004

To: Washington Field

Attn: AMERITHRAX Task Force

From: Washington Field  
AMERITHRAX 1

Contact:

Approved By:

Drafted By:

Case ID #: (U) 279A-WF-222936- (Pending) *956*

Title: (U) AMERITHRAX;  
Major Case 184;  
OO: Washington Field

b6  
b7C

b3  
b6  
b7C

GRAND JURY MATERIAL - DISSEMINATE PURSUANT TO RULE 6(e)

(U) ~~X~~

(U) ~~X~~

(U) ~~X~~

~~SECRET~~

b2  
b7E

~~Y~~

~~N~~

5:11 Amerithrax /upload/IVINS Bruce.ec

- 1 -

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 02/03/2004

On 01/29/2004, SA [ ] met DR. BRUCE E. IVINS at his place of business in the Bacteriology Division of the U.S. ARMY MEDICAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF INFECTIOUS DISEASES (USAMRIID), 1425 Porter Street, Fort Detrick, Maryland, to assist with the irradiation process of a *Bacillus anthracis* Ames strain spore sample labeled as "1030". The spore sample, approximately [ ] in volume, was contained within a 50mL screw top tube. IVINS entered room [ ] of the biological containment suite B-3 to retrieve sample "1030". The sample container was decontaminated with bleach and sequentially placed within two (2) ziploc-type packages, each decontaminated with bleach prior to being placed within the next. The sample was placed in the airlock of B-3, where SA [ ] retrieved the sample and placed it within another ziploc-type container, sealed it with evidence tape, and transferred it to the custody of [ ] for inactivation by gamma irradiation.

b6  
b7C  
b2  
b7F

On 01/30/2004, SA [ ] retrieved the then irradiated sample from [ ] and transported it to suite B-5, where IVINS set up two (2) blood agar plates and one (1) liquid culture to check the irradiated sample for viable organisms. The irradiated sample was resealed with evidence tape and secured in room [ ] until such time as the viability check was confirmed.

b6  
b7C

On 02/02/2003, IVINS contacted SA [ ] to advise that the irradiated sample was negative for viable organisms. SA [ ] obtained the samples from [ ] at USAMRIID, transported and secured the sample at the Washington Field Office.

The transfer of evidence was documented with a "Receipt of Property", FD-597, which is stored in the FD-340 section of the file. The certificates of irradiation and non-viability were submitted to the 1A section of the file.

[ ]

SSA  
SSAInvestigation on 1/29-2/2/2004 at Fort Detrick, MarylandFile # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID 476Date dictated 02/03/2004by SA [ ] BEI 24

1A#4674

- 1 -

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 03/25/2004

On March 18, 2004, BRUCE E. IVINS, date of birth 04/22/1946, social security account number 280-44-5449, was interviewed at his place of employment, the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), 1425 Porter Street, Fort Detrick, Maryland, telephone [REDACTED]. After being advised of the identity of the agents and the purpose of the interview, IVINS provided the following information: b6 b7C

IVINS consulted with [REDACTED] at USAMRIID Computer Services and learned that electronic mail (email) can be retrieved for a two year period, however it is expensive to do so. If more than two years have passed, it is not possible to retrieve email.

An individual by the name of [REDACTED] worked as a [REDACTED] for [REDACTED] at USAMRIID [REDACTED] was not happy at USAMRIID and left employment there. [REDACTED] would have contact information for [REDACTED]

IVINS was not familiar with modified G sporulation media and he has never worked with it. He first heard of modified G sporulation media from [REDACTED] and IVINS did not recall ever discussing the media with [REDACTED]

IVINS last spoke with [REDACTED] in [REDACTED] or [REDACTED] when [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] IVINS spoke with [REDACTED] outside of the building, perhaps in or near the library. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] walked by and saw IVINS talking to [REDACTED]

Only tryptic soy agar (TSA) plates from the Tissue Culture Group at USAMRIID are used to grow post-challenge *Bacillus anthracis* (B.a.). No sheep blood agar (SBA) plates are used for post-challenge B.a.

IVINS did not recall being in the walk-in cooler, Room [REDACTED] in Building 1412. He primarily used the first floor cold room in 1412 and sometimes used the basement cold room. He advised that Room [REDACTED] is probably used by those who work on the second floor of Building 1412.

Investigation on 03/18/2004 at Fort Detrick, Maryland  
158-279A-WF-222936-POI 730 1487  
File # 279A-WF-222936-~~USAMRIID~~ 279A-BA-C101392 Date dictated N/A  
SA [REDACTED]  
by SA [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID, 279A-BA-C101392, 279A-WF-222936-POI

Continuation of FD-302 of BRUCE EDWARDS IVINS, On 03/18/2004, Page 2

IVINS has not traveled to New Jersey since 2001 and has no affiliation with Princeton University other than through his father, who graduated from Princeton University in 1928. IVINS traveled as a child to Princeton, New Jersey, New York City, and throughout the Northeast with his family. During that family trip, IVINS toured Revolutionary War battlefields including the Battle of Trenton site and Bunker Hill, and also traveled to Plymouth Rock.

b6  
b7c

IVINS' only knowledge regarding the [REDACTED] was that [REDACTED] in the [REDACTED] is a member.

IVINS has never purchased any pre-stamped envelopes from a postal vending machine.

IVINS provided the following information relative to his whereabouts during September 17-18, 2001 and October 5-9, 2001:

five hard copies of emails sent and received by IVINS on September 17 and 19, 2001 and October 5, 2001;

copies of music lists for the church where he performed [REDACTED] on September 16, 2001 and October 7, 2001;

a hard copy of an email from [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] detailing some of IVINS' Red Cross activities during the fall of 2001, none of which fell within the two time frames in question;

a list of IVINS' bank and credit card account numbers and information.

These original documents are maintained in an FD-340 in the 1A section of the file.



- 1 -

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 04/12/2004

U.S. ARMY MEDICAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR INFECTIOUS DISEASES (USAMRIID) Scientist BRUCE IVINS and FBI Special Agent [redacted] inventoried *Bacillus anthracis* (Ba) Ames strain samples in building 1425, suite B-3 freezers and refrigerators on December 12, 2003. Of the many samples identified there were 22 Ba Ames strain isolates which were not previously submitted to the FBI repository (FBIR). The 22 samples belonged to multiple researchers who either presently or formerly worked in the Bacteriology Division at USAMRIID.

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b7C

On April 2, 2004, [redacted] at USAMRIID, [redacted] gave verbal approval to the Writer to coordinate the submission of these 22 Ba Ames strain samples to the FBIR. [redacted] indicated that as [redacted] at USAMRIID he had the authority to allow samples to be submitted to the FBIR, regardless of the originating scientist. [redacted] also notified IVINS that IVINS had permission to prepare the 22 samples to submit them to the FBIR.

On April 7, 2004, SA [redacted] submitted the above mentioned 22 Ba Ames strain isolates as well as 6 additional samples (1 from [redacted], 3 from [redacted] 2 from [redacted] all described below) to the FBI repository. Each sample consisted of 2 Tryptic Soy Agar slants. One slant was processed for submission into the FBIR. One slant was sent to NORTHERN ARIZONA UNIVERSITY (NAU), for Multi-Locus Variable Number Tandem Repeat Analysis (MLVA) by [redacted] and [redacted] NAU received the slants in good condition on April 9, 2004. The sample locations, sample descriptions, and submitting USAMRIID scientists are as follows:

[redacted] prepared the following sample, which was located in the refrigerator in Room [redacted] in the B-3-Suite:

1	Sample labeled [redacted] (known to be [redacted] Approximately 8 mL in 50 mL Falcon tube registered to IVINS, samples was to be used in research conducted by [redacted]
---	---

b6  
b7C  
b2  
b7FInvestigation on 4/7/2004 at Frederick, MDFile # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID-624

Date dictated \_\_\_\_\_

b6  
b7Cby SA [redacted] BE/26

Continuation of FD-302 of \_\_\_\_\_, On 4/14/2004, Page 2

BRUCE IVINS prepared and submitted the following samples, which were located in the -70 degree Celsius freezer in B-3 suite hallway:

2	Box labeled "[redacted]" - 6 tubes labeled "Ames"
3	Box labeled "Ames spores from [redacted] from orig. Ames slant diluted in [redacted] to about [redacted] 18 tubes
4	Box labeled "Mikesell" - 5 tubes labeled "[redacted]"
5	White plastic Nalgene box labeled "Mikesell" - 1 tube labeled "[redacted]"
6	Styrofoam rack - One 15 mL Falcon tube labeled "[redacted]"
7	Box labeled "BA cultures 1a" - One tube labeled Ames "Ames BA [redacted]"
8	Box labeled "'b' box stock cultures" - One tube labeled "Ames BA [redacted]"
9	250 mL Beaker - One 15 mL Falcon tube labeled "Ames [redacted]"
10	250 mL Beaker - One 15 mL Falcon tube labeled "Ames [redacted]"

b6  
b7C  
b2  
b7F

BRUCE IVINS prepared and submitted the following samples, which were located in the walk-in refrigerator in room [redacted]:

11	Box of [redacted] samples as described by Bruce Ivins - One 15 mL Falcon tube labeled "[redacted]"
12	Box of [redacted] samples as described by Bruce Ivins - One 15 mL Falcon tube labeled "[redacted]"
13	Styrofoam Eppendorf Rack - One 1.5mL eppendorf labeled "Ames [redacted]"
14	Styrofoam Eppendorf Rack - One 1.5mL eppendorf labeled "Ames [redacted]"

Continuation of FD-302 of \_\_\_\_\_, On 4/14/2004, Page 3

15	Styrofoam Eppendorf Rack- One 1.5mL eppendorf labeled "Ames [REDACTED]"
16	Styrofoam Eppendorf Rack- One 1.5mL eppendorf labeled "Ames [REDACTED]"
17	Tube rack- Two 20 mL glass tubes labeled [REDACTED] "in Phenol gel phos"
18	Tube rack- One 20 mL glass tube labeled "[REDACTED]" Ames [REDACTED]
19	Tube rack- One tube labeled "[REDACTED]" [REDACTED]
20	Tube rack- One tube labeled "[REDACTED]" [REDACTED]
21	Plastic tube rack labeled "[REDACTED]"
22	Plastic tube rack labeled "[REDACTED]"
23	Plastic tube rack labeled "[REDACTED]"

b6  
b7C  
b2  
b7F

[REDACTED] prepared and submitted the following samples:

24- 26	3 Ba Ames strain samples identified when [REDACTED] cleaned out her freezer with SA [REDACTED]
-----------	---

[REDACTED] prepared and submitted the following samples:

27	27) Registration [REDACTED] Ba Ames strain, investigator: [REDACTED] [REDACTED] location Room [REDACTED] Bldg 1412, date registered: 2/23/01
28	Registration [REDACTED] Ba Ames strain, investigator: BRUCE IVINS, location Room [REDACTED] Bldg 1412, date registered: 7/16/02, facility registration #7738, 5ml left in a 50 ml vial; leftovers used in aerosol challenges. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] was looking for this sample and actually found it in the 1 <sup>st</sup> floor coldroom.

- 1 -

Date of transcription 04/13/2004

On 04/07/2004, SA [REDACTED] accompanied ~~BRUCE E. IVINS~~ of the Bacteriology Division of the U.S. ARMY MEDICAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF INFECTIOUS DISEASES (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland, into suite B-3 of USAMRIID building 1425, to secure several samples of *Bacillus anthracis* Ames strain. Samples included:

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[illegible]

b6  
b7C  
b2  
b7E

Date dictated 04/13/2004

by SA

b6  
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BACK OF PAGE 212

b6  
b7C

SSA

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of BRUCE E. IVINS, On 04/07,09/2004 Page 2

Ames	
* Ames Spores	
Ames	

b6  
b7C  
b2  
b7F

\* Designated as [redacted] by Bruce E. Ivins, FD-302, dated 12/15/2003.

These samples were secured and double-locked in a Fire and Water-proof safe, sealed with evidence tape, and stored in the walk-in refrigerator of suite B-3.

Samples within the -70C freezer located in the hallway of suite B-3 were also secured. Samples included:

Container "Sample Label"	Number of Samples
[redacted] "Ames"	6
Ames spores from [redacted] [redacted] from orig. Ames slant diluted in [redacted] to about [redacted]	18
Mikesell [redacted]	5
Mikesell Plastic Nalgene box "Ames FTD 1004"	1
15mL Falcon tube [redacted]	1
BA cultures 1a Box "Ames BA [redacted]"	1
B box stock cultures "Ames BA [redacted]"	1
15mL Falcon tube [redacted] Ames [redacted]	1
15mL Falcon tube [redacted] Ames [redacted]	1

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of BRUCE E. IVINS, On 04/07, 09/2004, Page 3

These samples were secured and double-locked in a Fire and Water-proof safe, sealed with evidence tape, and stored in the -70C freezer in the hallway of suite B-3.

On 04/09/2004, SA [ ] accompanied IVINS into suite B-3 of USAMRIID building 1425, to secure several samples of *Bacillus anthracis* Ames strain. The samples secured included:

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Sample Label	Approximate volume	
7739a		
7739b		
7739c		

b2  
b7F

These samples were secured and double-locked in the Fire and Water-proof safe stored in the walk-in refrigerator of suite B-3 and sealed with evidence tape.

- 1 -

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 04/13/2004b6  
b7C

On April 13, 2004, BRUCE E. IVINS, date of birth April 22, 1946, social security account number 280-44-5449, was interviewed telephonically at his place of employment, the UNITED STATES ARMY MEDICAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF INFECTIOUS DISEASES (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland, telephone [REDACTED]. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and the purpose of the interview, that being to clarify certain entries in IVINS' Reference Material Receipt Record of *Bacillus anthracis* (Ba) spores sent to USAMRIID from Dugway Proving Ground, Dugway, Utah, IVINS provided the following information:

[REDACTED] worked in Building [REDACTED] and IVINS believed he used a [REDACTED] IVINS was unsure of [REDACTED] place of employment, but thinks [REDACTED] may have worked at [REDACTED] telephone [REDACTED] would be able to provide that information.

One illegible entry that IVINS deciphered was from December 14, 2000, and involved a rabbit challenge conducted for BIORPORT. A second illegible entry was from May 1, 2001, and was clarified as [REDACTED] and "BATTELLE", a research facility in Columbus, Ohio. Other unreadable entries were determined to read "BOO-03" (Parts 1-8), which were samples used for aerosol challenges for [REDACTED].

IVINS knew [REDACTED] (first name unknown) [REDACTED] a male from [REDACTED] through [REDACTED] (phonetic). [REDACTED] called IVINS about a test [REDACTED] had developed for killing Ba spores instantaneously. IVINS did not send [REDACTED] any Ba samples but performed [REDACTED] test himself, finding that the test did reduce the number of Ba spores and their viability but was no more effective than the other methods already in place for killing Ba spores. IVINS was later contacted by [REDACTED] telephone number [REDACTED] electronic mail address [REDACTED] from the UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (SEC) in Fort Worth, Texas. [REDACTED] was investigating [REDACTED] in an alleged "pump and dump" scheme, in which individuals recruit large quantities of investors for a certain stock through false or misleading statements. After driving the stock price up, the individuals then quickly sell the stock, making a large profit for themselves but

Investigation on 04/13/2004 at Fort Detrick, Maryland (telephonically)

File # 279A-WF-222936, 279A-BA-C101392 - A37 Date dictated N/A

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b7C

by SA [REDACTED] BEI 28



279A-WF-222936, 279A-BA-C101392

Continuation of FD-302 of BRUCE E. IVINS, On 04/13/2004, Page 2

leaving the other investors with losses when the stock is no longer being hyped and the price falls. IVINS has had no recent contact with [REDACTED] and is unaware of the results of the SEC investigation.

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IVINS provided a new entry that he had previously forgotten to write down. On March 7, 2001, IVINS sent less than [REDACTED] of Ba to [REDACTED]

IVINS emphasized that he had no reason to suspect that anyone he worked with in Bacteriology was responsible for mailing the anthrax letters. He was very concerned about the possibility of the Dugway Ba being involved in the anthrax mailings. Building 1412 is a "black hole" for Ba, and IVINS and his coworkers believed that the Dugway spores were safe in the B3 and B4 suites. Consequently, they saw no need to guard their trash.

- 1 -

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 05/04/2004

On May 4, 2004, BRUCE E. IVINS, date of birth 04/22/1946, social security account number 280-44-5449, place of employment, the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), 1425 Porter Street, Fort Detrick, Maryland, telephone [REDACTED] contacted SA [REDACTED] telephonically and provided the following information:

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IVINS advised that he had been interviewed recently by an FBI agent whose identity he could not recall, and that he told the agent that he used sterile water for injection when creating Bacillus anthracis (B.a.) Ames spore preparations. IVINS then learned from [REDACTED] that they actually used USAMRIID's supply of distilled deionized Milli-Q water for Ames spore preparations.

ivin8302.wpd

Investigation on 05/04/2004 at Falls Church, Virginia (telephonically)File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID 279A-BA-C101392 Date dictated N/Aby SA [REDACTED] BE129b6  
b7C

- 1 -

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 05/09/2004

On May 7, 2004, BRUCE EDWARD IVINS was interviewed at his place of employment, the United States Army Medical Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Frederick, Maryland. The interview was conducted by Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) [redacted] and Special Agent [redacted] of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). IVINS, who was already familiar with the identities of the interviewers, provided the following information:

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IVINS has documentation back to approximately 1992 of transfers he made of the Ames strain of *Bacillus anthracis* (Ba). He does not have documents regarding transfers made prior to 1992. IVINS sent Ames to Dugway Proving Ground (hereinafter referred to as Dugway) in 1992 and in 1997. The 1997 shipment was to provide Dugway with the material to produce spores for USAMRIID to use in aerosol challenge studies.

It was probably not noted in IVINS laboratory notebooks from which supply (flask, vial, or isolate) of Ames IVINS or his coworkers took the material to be shipped to the various external laboratories. IVINS pointed out on the forms he provided to the agents during this interview that he noted on the Dugway shipment and on the shipment of Ames to [redacted] that he used [redacted] as the source of the Ames he shipped.

[redacted] is a [redacted] at Battelle Memorial Institute (BMI) who requested some of IVINS spores. [redacted] is not [redacted] but is [redacted] the spores.

The Ames sent to the Defense Research Establishment at Suffield (DRES) in Canada was probably Ames grown by IVINS or his coworkers, but he cannot recall what the source of the material was. In the photograph of the Ames vial sent to IVINS by [redacted] of DRES, the writing on the vial is that of [redacted]. She may have prepared the shipment of Ames for DRES. They could have used Dugway spores or frozen vegetative material, but IVINS does not recall.

USAMRIID now keeps documentation of internal transfers of select agents, but they did not in prior years.

Investigation on 05/07/04 at Frederick, Marylandb6  
b7CFile # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID-772 Date dictated N/Aby SSA [redacted]  
SA [redacted]

T: IVINS302

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of Bruce Edward Ivins, On 05/07/04, Page 2

The Ames strain IVINS has was originally obtained from [redacted] IVINS does not know what happened to the second slant and infected tissue sample from the original shipment, and he never saw them. To IVINS knowledge, no one at USAMRIID has found those two parts of the original shipment of Ames to USAMRIID.

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SSA [redacted] advised IVINS that she is in possession of his laboratory notebooks and had questions about some of the notations. IVINS provided the following: "L-broth" is not Leighton-Doi broth. It is a media composed of yeast extract, beef extract, and sodium chloride, which produces little spore formation with Ames. When Leighton-Doi broth was used, it would have been noted as "L-D broth" of Leighton-Doi.

IVINS recently told another FBI agent that they make the final resuspension of spores in water for injection (WFI), which is endotoxin-free bottled water, but he was wrong. After his conversation with the agent, he asked [redacted] and learned that they now do the final resuspension in USAMRIID house-distilled water which has gone through a deionizing column. They also use this water to make Leighton-Doi broth for growing Ba.

IVINS has never had to add antifoam or any other chemical to his production method for producing Ames spores. The shaking of the shaker flasks in the broth production is not enough to create a need for antifoam or any similar product. He is not aware of any protocol used at USAMRIID which calls for the use of antifoam with Ames. The protocol for the aerosol challenges does not call for antifoam. IVINS showed SAs [redacted] and [redacted] the difference between Ames grown on agar and Ames grown in broth. They use broth-grown material for all of the challenges because the Ames preparations made that way are so clean in comparison to agar-grown material.

IVINS does not recall ever sending Ames to BIOPORT. In 2001, he sent Ames spores to BMI. IVINS [redacted] went to a conference on post-exposure prophylaxis problems. At this conference, [redacted] (phonetic) of BMI talked about Ames which belonged to PERRY MIKESELL. MIKESELL could have taken Ames to BMI, but it should have been documented. IVINS has no knowledge of MIKESELL discreetly taking Ames from USAMRIID to BMI. If MIKESELL did so, he should not have. [redacted] may have more information about MIKESELL's Ames.

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of Bruce Edward Ivins, On 05/07/04, Page 3

The Ames produced by Dugway for USAMRIID in 1997 was made for aerosol challenges and was widely used at USAMRIID by multiple researchers. IVINS kept a record of his distribution of this material. He had previously provided his record to agents, but he has updated the distribution list since then. IVINS provided his updated list during this interview. SSA [ ] pointed out a mathematical error on the list to IVINS. He had not previously noted the mistake and believes there should thus be more material left than his balance shows.

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When challenges were scheduled and required the 1997 Dugway Ames, the bottle of Ames spores was taken to either Room [ ] or [ ] of building 1412. Sometimes it was taken there a day or two prior to the scheduled spray. The aliquots of Ames were prepared in 1412 from the main bottle. The dilution tubes made from the Ames collected by the all-glass-impinger (AGI) were plated on tryptic soy agar plates. These dilution tubes of Ames were stored in the first floor cold room until the plates had been counted. Sometimes the tubes might stay in the cold room for 24 hours to several days following a spray. This cold room is a walk-in refrigerator on the first floor, not in the basement of 1412. Other than this Ames material temporarily stored in 1412, the larger quantities of Ames were kept in suite B3. The B3 material was not under lock and key, but was kept inside the hot suite. It was March 1999 when Ames sample [ ] was first taken into building 1412.

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[ ] has used IVINS Ames material known as RMR 1029. [ ] obtained [ ] of this material from IVINS on 8/28/2000 for diagnosis detection research. [ ] worked for [ ] so if IVINS gave Ames to him, it would have been for aerosol challenge work. IVINS believes all aerosol challenges with Ames at USAMRIID from 1997 until 2002 utilized the Dugway Ames. IVINS does not believe he provided a sample of RMR 1029 to [ ] for [ ] collection. IVINS was the one who usually disseminated the Ames as people requested it.

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IVINS does not recall ever seeing any researchers from DRES inside suite B3 of USAMRIID. Though the post-heat-shock plating is done in 1412 to determine the spore concentration after heat-shocking, other plating is done inside suite B3 of 1425. Whenever IVINS' research group wanted to determine the concentration of any of their supplies of spores, they plated Ames in suite B3. These plates, once counted, were autoclaved out through the suite. They were put in autoclave bags which were tied

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of Bruce Edward Ivins, On 05/07/04, Page 4

up, then placed in a brown bag which was taped. When this trash was put in the cold hallway, it had already been autoclaved.

IVINS tested Tween 80 or Tween 20 at one time. Tween is an antifoam. If spores clumped, they tested the addition of Tween during the challenge. He does not use Tween in his routine spore production or challenges.

During fermentation, as a culture gets older, there can be foaming on top. An electronic probe in the fermenter senses the foaming and injects antifoam. IVINS is not sure if antifoam is always used in fermentation. He thinks Sigma-Aldrich may be a source for antifoam, but he does not purchase it and does not know what kind would be used.

[redacted] did [redacted] work at USAMRIID. [redacted] was a first-rate [redacted] He worked in [redacted] in the [redacted] lab. [redacted]

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[redacted] Before September 11, 2001, researchers at USAMRIID did not scrutinize their coworkers. They did not wonder if someone present in a hot suite was there for the wrong reason.

IVINS took the interviewing agents past the autoclave crash door for suite B3, showed how this suite connected to B4, and showed the fermentation room. Two of the fermenters visible in the room have been purchased in the last 3 years or so.

IVINS provided the following documents to the agents during the interview:

USAMRIID Shipment Request form dated May 3, 2001 for the shipment of Ames spores to [redacted] at BMI.

USAMRIID Shipment Request form dated June 15, 2001 for the shipment of Ames spores to [redacted] at BMI.

Page two of IVINS' updated record of distribution of RMR 1029.

E-mails between IVINS, [redacted] (DRES) regarding the shipment of Ames to DRES with a digital photograph of a vial of Ames with [redacted] handwriting on it.

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of Bruce Edward Ivins, On 05/07/04, Page 5

USAMRIID Shipment Request form dated August 21, 1998 for the shipment of Ba strains to DRES.

E-mail from IVINS to [REDACTED] about shipments for a congressional hearing in November 2001.

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E-mail from [REDACTED] about the Ames history.

USAMRIID Shipment Request dated October 8, 1992 for shipment of Ames to Dugway.

E-mail dated March 19, 2004 forwarding e-mails dated October 12, 2004 about shipments of Ames from USAMRIID.

E-mail dated May 7, 2004 listing the shipments of Ames from Dugway to USAMRIID (e-mail prepared for SSA [REDACTED]).

E-mails dated October 12, 2004 about distribution of Ames from USAMRIID to other facilities.

E-mail dated November 6, 2001 about the original receipt of Ames at Porton Down.

USAMRIID Shipment Request dated March 2, 2001 for the shipment of Ames from RMR 1029 from IVINS to [REDACTED] the University of New Mexico.



- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 06/08/2004

On 06/03/2004, SA [redacted] accompanied ~~BRUCE E. IVINS~~ of the Bacteriology Division, U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland, into biological containment suite B3 in building 1425 of USAMRIID to retrieve twenty-five (25) spore samples of the Ames strain of *Bacillus anthracis*. The spore samples had previously been secured in a fire-safe with two locks and evidence tape in the walk-in cold room of Suite B3 on 04/09/2004. The locks and evidence tape remained intact.

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12  
[redacted]

An inventory of the twenty-five (25) samples is as follows:

	Sample Description	Approximate Volume
1	Ames spores [redacted]	[redacted]
2	[redacted]	
3	Ames spores renografin purified [redacted] 7739c	
4	[redacted] spores from agar [redacted]	
5	Purified ames spores [redacted]	
6	Ames spores 2433 CDC 7738	
7	[redacted]	
8	[redacted]	
9	Ames [redacted]	
10	[redacted] Ames [redacted]	
11	Ames spores [redacted]	
12	[redacted]	
13	[redacted]	
14	Ames [redacted]	

b2  
b7F

File:

Investigation on 06/03/2004 at Fort Detrick, Maryland

File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID-849 Date dictated 06/08/2004

b6  
b7C

by SA [redacted]

BEI 31



279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of BRUCE E. IVINS, On 06/03/2004, Page 2

15	Undiluted purified spores		
16	Ames		
17	Ames ?		
18			
19		Ames	
20		Ames	
21		Ames	
22	Ames stock		
23	Oct 97 GLP ames spores RMR 1029 "Left 200mL 11/19 (crossed out)" 160mL 4/21		
24	Ames		
25	Ames		

b6  
b7C  
b2  
b7F

While recording the information for the inventory in the table above, SA [REDACTED] displayed sample #22 "Ames stock [REDACTED] [REDACTED], to IVINS and asked what he could remember about that particular sample. IVINS recalled that sample #22 "Ames stock [REDACTED] [REDACTED] had originated from a box containing [REDACTED] samples. IVINS could not find the box and said that the walk-in cold room had been recently cleaned up.

The samples, which had previously been placed in individual ziploc-type bags, were taken from the cold-room to the airlock of Suite B3. The bags containing the samples were wiped down with a bleach solution and placed in a container for transport by SA [REDACTED] of the Washington Field Office and HMO [REDACTED] of the Laboratory Division, Hazardous Materials Response Unit, watching from the other side of the Suite B3 airlock.

b6  
b7C

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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 06/04/2004

On June 3, 2004, Special Agent (SA) [REDACTED] of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Washington Field Office (WFO), received from Dr. BRUCE IVINS, Bacteriology Division, United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland, Twenty-five (25) samples, containing live *Bacillus anthracis* Ames strain spores. These spores were secured from Biological Safety Level (BSL) 3 containment suite B-3 located in Building 1425 of USAMRIID by SA Darin Steele.

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An FD 597, Receipt for Property, form was executed and placed in a 1A envelope and sent to file. (P1)

The samples were subsequently transported to the NAVY MEDICAL RESEARCH CENTER (NMRC), 503 Robert Grant Avenue, Silver Spring, Maryland, via WFO helicopter, and turned over to the custody of [REDACTED]. An FD 597, Receipt for Property, form was executed and placed in a 1A envelope and sent to file. A copy of the EA 101, Report of Transfer of Select Biological Agents form was provided to [REDACTED] and a copy of the EA 101 was placed in a 1A envelope and sent to file.

Investigation on 06/03/2004 at Fort Detrick, MarylandFile # 279A-WF-222936-1A-202 BEI 32 Date dictated \_\_\_\_\_by SA [REDACTED]  
SA [REDACTED]b6  
b7C

- 1 -

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 06/29/2004

On June 29, 2004, BRUCE E. IVINS, date of birth 04/22/1946, social security account number 280-44-5449, was interviewed at his place of employment, the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Frederick, Maryland, telephone [REDACTED] by Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) [REDACTED] and Special Agent (SA) [REDACTED] IVINS provided the following information:

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SSA [REDACTED] advised IVINS that the FBI was tracking the history, to include genealogy and usage, of *Bacillus anthracis* (B.a.) isolates submitted to the FBI Repository. SSA [REDACTED] requested access to laboratory notebooks assigned to IVINS in order to begin this process which would include notebooks kept by other researchers as well. The Judge Advocate General's (JAG) prior request regarding the removal of original notebooks from USAMRIID's premises was acknowledged by SSA [REDACTED] and it was explained that a review of the notebooks could occur with minimal impact to ongoing research.

IVINS provided the interviewing Agents with a three page document which contained a list of all of the notebooks assigned to him during his tenure at USAMRIID. Fifty-one (51) notebooks were identified by both the USAMRIID notebook number and a number assigned to each by IVINS. Some of IVINS' notebooks were submitted to the USAMRIID library for archival. The library did not store the notebooks on a permanent basis, thus some of IVINS' notebooks had been previously destroyed. A review of library records would indicate which were destroyed and which were maintained in the library archive. IVINS was aware that at least five of his notebooks had been destroyed, and those notebook numbers were marked out on the list he provided to the interviewing Agents. IVINS indicated that notebooks 1 and 2 were submitted to the library, and he was not sure if they were still in existence. Notebook 3 was the oldest notebook maintained in IVINS' office.

All of the notebooks maintained by IVINS were located in his office, with the exception of fifteen (15) notebooks which were in the possession of SSA [REDACTED]. Notations on IVINS' inventory identified the notebooks previously given to the FBI. SSA [REDACTED] requested that the remainder of IVINS' notebooks referencing Ames research be pulled from the collection and set aside for review by SA [REDACTED] on-site at USAMRIID at a later date. IVINS believed there to be at least fifteen additional notebooks in his collection which documented Ames-related

Investigation on 06/29/2004 at Frederick, MD

File # 279A-WF-222936-~~USAMRIID~~ <sup>BEI 33</sup> ~~862~~SSA [REDACTED]  
by SA [REDACTED]

Date dictated

279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of Bruce Ivins, On 06/29/2004, Page 2

research. He agreed to review the notebooks, beginning with the most recent, and to identify those containing references to Ames even if Ames was only used as a control and was not the focus of the research. IVINS designated a shelf in his office where the notebooks would be placed and indicated that SA [ ] was free to return at any time to review the notebooks. An agreement was reached that SA [ ] could enter IVINS' office at any time, remove notebooks from the designated shelf, leave a note indicating which notebooks she was reviewing, and then take the notebooks to the USAMRIID library to review and photocopy pertinent information. IVINS agreed to notify his two coworkers with whom he shares the office of this agreement with the FBI.

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IVINS kept only those notebooks assigned to him. Other investigators in the Bacteriology Division were responsible for the notebooks assigned to them. The list of IVINS' assigned notebooks is maintained in a 1A envelop (FD-340).

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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 08/02/2004

On 07/23/2004, during a consent to search of the U.S.  
ARMY MEDICAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF INFECTIOUS DISEASES  
(USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland, Special Agent (SA) [redacted]  
[redacted] located, in Building 1425, Suite B4, Room [redacted] a  
cardboard box labeled as [redacted], which contained many glass  
and plastic tubes.

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b7C  
b7E

BRUCE E. IVINS indicated, to the best of his  
recollection, this was the same box from which he had retrieved  
two (2) Ames samples during an inventory with SA [redacted] in  
December of 2003.

file:

[redacted]

b6  
b7CInvestigation on 07/23/2004 at Fort Detrick, MarylandFile # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID 957 Date dictated 08/02/2004

by SA [redacted]

BEI 34

- 1 -

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 08/20/2004

On August 4, 2004, BRUCE IVINS of the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland, telephonically contacted Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) [redacted] of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). IVINS reported that [redacted] also of USAMRIID, had provided him with a scientific article abstract about *Bacillus* spore suspensions in which the addition of silica to the spore coat was discussed. IVINS offered to send the article abstract via facsimile to SSA [redacted] and subsequently sent the abstract to the FBI offsite in Frederick, Maryland. The cover sheet and article abstract are maintained in the 1A section of the file.

b6  
b7CInvestigation on 08/04/2004 at Olean, New York (telephonically)File # 279A-WF-222936-<sup>BEI 35</sup>USAMRIID-902 Date dictated N/A

by SSA [redacted]

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This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

T:\... \ivins 84, wpd

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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 08/23/2004

On Saturday, August 21, 2004, BRUCE IVINS of the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland, telephonically contacted Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) [REDACTED] of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). IVINS advised that the Los Angeles Times had run an article the previous day which IVINS believed disclosed information that was confidential FBI information. IVINS claimed the article detailed the results of environmental swabbing conducted within USAMRIID in approximately early 2002 and that the swabbing and identification of pathogens was done for the FBI. IVINS claimed that it was upsetting to see that kind of information being made public. He offered to send the article via facsimile (fax) to SSA [REDACTED] and subsequently faxed it to the Frederick, Maryland offsite office of the FBI. IVINS provided his home telephone number, [REDACTED] to SSA [REDACTED] for re-contact regarding the article. The faxed article from the Los Angeles Times and cover sheet are maintained in the 1A section of the file.

b6  
b7CInvestigation on 08/21/2004 at Washington, DC (telephonically)File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID-900 *BEI 36* Date dictated N/Ab6  
b7C

by SSA [REDACTED]

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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 09/13/2004


On September 10, 2004, BRUCE E. IVINS, date of birth  
04/22/1946, social security account number 280-44-5449, place of  
employment, the United States Army Medical Research Institute of  
Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland, telephone  
[redacted] contacted telephonically.

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IVINS advised that he had drawn a "tree" illustrating the source of the seed stock for his *Bacillus anthracis* (B.a.) Ames spore production and that he would like to send the document to SA [redacted] via fax. SA [redacted] provided IVINS with the fax machine number at the NVRA and received the fax at approximately 11:15am. Attached hereto and considered part of this document is the above mentioned fax.

Investigation on 09/10/2004 at Falls Church, Virginia (telephonically)File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID-982Date dictated N/Aby SA [redacted]b6  
b7C





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b7E

-1-

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 09/13/2004

On September 13, 2004, BRUCE E. IVINS, date of birth 04/22/1946, social security account number 280-44-5449, place of employment, the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland, telephone [redacted] contacted SA [redacted] telephonically.

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IVINS clarified a statement that he made during a 09/08/2004 interview with SA [redacted] and SA [redacted]. Although he had never transported the flask containing *Bacillus anthracis* (B.a.) Ames spores sample RMR 1029 from Building 1425 to Building 1412, he did transport undiluted aliquots from RMR 1029 to Building 1412 multiple times for [redacted] and once for [redacted] (writer believes this person to be [redacted]). IVINS provided [redacted] of RMR 1029 to [redacted] and brought the aliquot to Room [redacted] in Building 1412.

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b2  
b7FInvestigation on 09/13/2004 at Falls Church, Virginia (telephonically)File # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID BE139Date dictated N/Ab6  
b7Cby SA [redacted]

- 1 -

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 09/29/2004

On September 20, 2004, BRUCE E. IVINS, date of birth 04/22/1946, social security account number 280-44-5449, was interviewed at his place of employment, the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), 1425 Porter Street, Fort Detrick, Maryland, telephone [REDACTED]. After being advised of the identity of the agent and the purpose of the interview, IVINS provided the following information:

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IVINS' laboratory group has been producing one trillion *Bacillus anthracis* (B.a.) Ames spores per week using the Leighton and Doi protocol. They have not used fermentation in the production of these spores.

IVINS explained that around the late 1980s or early 1990s, spores began being stored in water and 1% phenol in the refrigerator, and being shipped refrigerated. Prior to then, spores were stored and shipped frozen.

Vegetative cells are not usually stored because they can be grown at any time, however when they are stored, they are frozen with a cryopreservative such as glycerol. Vegetative cells are shipped in this same manner.

Investigation on 09/20/2004 at Fort Detrick, MarylandFile # 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID-981Date dictated N/Ab6  
b7Cby SA [REDACTED]

- 1 -

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 09/30/2004

Upon review of BRUCE IVINS' home telephone records and credit card purchases for 2001, it was noted that The College Board in Ewing, New Jersey (NJ) was called from his home telephone, and that IVINS also had a credit card charge to The College Board for October SAT registration.

On July 30, 2004, SA [ ] called The College Board, telephone 609-771-7600 to obtain return address information for mailings sent out by The College Board. SA [ ] was connected to [ ] extension [ ] and after being advised of the identity of the agent and the purpose of the interview, [ ] provided the following information:

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The registration ticket for the October SATs currently comes in a white envelope with the return address listed as PO Box 6200, Princeton, NJ 08541. [ ] advised that the registration ticket likely had the same return address during 2001.

Investigation on 07/30/2004 at Falls Church, Virginia (telephonically)

File # 279A-WF-222936-~~POI-1333~~  
BEL-41

Date dictated N/A

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by SA [ ]

279A-WF-222936-DOI-V335

[REDACTED]

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The following investigation was conducted by Special Agent [REDACTED] on 10/12/2004:

Access was granted to the United States Army Military Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) personnel files of

[REDACTED] BRUCE IVINS, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The following information was obtained during a review of these files:

[REDACTED] earned a [REDACTED] of [REDACTED] degree in [REDACTED] from the University of [REDACTED] in [REDACTED]. In [REDACTED] [REDACTED] earned a [REDACTED] degree in [REDACTED] from [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] located in [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] earned his [REDACTED] from [REDACTED] in [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] began working at USAMRIID in [REDACTED] and has worked there ever since.

IVINS attended a conference in 1996 titled "Lyophilization: A Short Course."

According to [REDACTED] direct deposit form, he banks at [REDACTED] account number [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] direct deposit form indicates that he banks at [REDACTED] account number [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] direct deposit form indicates that he banks at [REDACTED] account number [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] direct deposit form indicates that she banks at [REDACTED] account number [REDACTED]

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WF-222936-BE1 - 42

- 1 -

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 12/15/2004

BRUCE E. IVINS, white male, date of birth 04/22/1946, social security number 280-44-5449, 622 Military Road, Frederick, Maryland 21702, telephone number [REDACTED] was interviewed at his place of business, The United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland, telephone number [REDACTED]. After being advised the identity of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, he provided the following information:

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In late 1999, IVINS was asked by his commanding officer to participate on a team to assist Bioport with potency testing for the anthrax vaccine. This was an order that came from the General. IVINS could not recall who the commanding officers were at the time. The command was in contact with [REDACTED] from Bioport who elicited the support of USAMRIID because they were having problems with the potency of the anthrax vaccine. The acceptable potency level was not acceptable for The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to approve the vaccine for distribution/sale. The team was comprised of; IVINS, [REDACTED] from USAMRIID. [REDACTED] was also a part of this team. [REDACTED] was working for [REDACTED] at the time. [REDACTED] has since left [REDACTED] and now works at [REDACTED]. Others may have been involved, however IVINS could not recall.

Initially, [REDACTED] IVINS met with representatives from Bioport on several occasions. They met in Columbus, Ohio and in Crystal City, Virginia. IVINS recalled that [REDACTED] (SP) from Bioport attended these meetings. [REDACTED] and IVINS also traveled to Bioport's headquarters in Lansing, Michigan.

In the late 1990's, Bioport ran out of Vollum 1B spores and [REDACTED] requested spores from IVINS. IVINS supplied [REDACTED] with spores prepared in Leighton-Doi. [REDACTED] then telephoned IVINS stating that all their guinea pigs had died during the intradermal challenge, and suspected that the reason was because the spores he had sent Bioport were "too hot", meaning too virulent. IVINS then sent Bioport more spore preparations grown in blood agar. Bioport encountered the same results and stated that the second spore preparations were also "too hot". IVINS recalled sending Bioport preparations a third time, however could not recall the media used.

Investigation on 12/03/2004 at Frederick, MDFile # 279A-WF-222936-POI-144 BEI-43 Date dictated N/Aby SA [REDACTED]  
USPIS [REDACTED]b6  
b7C

IVINS.WPD

279A-WF-222936-POI

Continuation of FD-302 of Bruce Ivins, On 12/03/2004, Page 2

and the third challenge netted the same results. On one occasion, IVINS consulted with [ ] but could not recall the time frame or the details of the conversation. IVINS thought that [ ] might have some insight regarding "hot" spores and the situation they were faced with at Bioport. It was later determined that the guinea pigs were the cause of the failed challenges. IVINS could not recall the defect in the animals, but stated that Bioport bred their own guinea pigs.

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After determining that the guinea pigs were the problem, Bioport still encountered problems with their potency testing. Fifty percent (50%) of the Guinea pigs were dying upon being challenged. [ ] from Bioport formulated a greater response math formula utilizing four (4) different dilutions and looking for a mathematical response relating to survival. IVINS described that the doctors at Bioport felt that a fifty percent (50%) survival rate was acceptable. This caused a disagreement between IVINS and the doctors at Bioport. IVINS did not agree that a fifty percent (50%) survival rate was acceptable for human beings. IVINS further explained that [ ] formulated a mathematical formula which consisted of "playing with the numbers" until the numbers reflected a survival rate acceptable to the FDA for approval of the vaccine. IVINS did not fight this issue any further because it was out of his control and area of responsibilities while assisting Bioport. IVINS' group worked on this project until October 16, 2001 with no resolution. [ ] changed the math, in which the potency of the vaccine reflected the acceptance for FDA approval.

IVINS further added that he heard [ ] had been [ ] prior to working at Bioport. He did not hear any reasons for this [ ] Also involved in this project was [ ] from Bioport. [ ] still telephones IVINS and [ ] from time to time with questions. IVINS could not recall the questions, they were laboratory related, however he does not pay much attention to [ ]

IVINS described the doctors at Bioport as incompetent. He described the other individuals working at Bioport as "people with very poor laboratory practices". "Individuals with no science background, and essentially assembly line technicians hired to put out a product".

IVINS gave an example of poor quality control at Bioport which included an instance during an FDA inspection. A fan was found to have been replaced backwards after a routine preventive

279A-WF-222936-POI

Continuation of FD-302 of Bruce Ivins, On 12/03/2004, Page 3

maintenance. The contaminated air from the laboratory was blowing back into the building rather than being pulled into a filter. As a result, FDA shut the bottling area of Bioport down.

While at Bioport, IVINS worked with Vollum 1B spores. When he needed additional spores for his research, a Bioport employee would place a container of spores outside his laboratory and knock on the door. IVINS would hear a knock on the door, open the door and find the spores in a container on the floor. No one would be in sight.

IVINS felt that [redacted] was the most competent employee at Bioport. He did not comment as to why he felt this way, but stated that [redacted] worked for [redacted] and her responsibilities included [redacted]  
[redacted]

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IVINS suggested and encouraged investigators to speak with [redacted] to confirm the information provided as [redacted] witnessed the same.

IVINS conducted a quick search of his email account at USAMRIID and printed out any e-mails relating to Bioport. Enclosed are copies of these e-mails. The original copies were placed into a 1-A envelope.



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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 01/25/2005

The following investigation was conducted on January 13, 2005 by SSA [redacted] SA [redacted] SA [redacted] SA [redacted] SA [redacted] and SA [redacted] of the AMERITHRAX Task Force and SA [redacted] SA [redacted] [redacted] and [redacted] from Washington Field Office (WFO) CART:

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A consensual search was conducted on January 13, 2005 of the office spaces utilized by BRUCE IVINS, [redacted] and [redacted] [redacted] for computer workstations, any storage media, and any location at the place of their employment where these items may have been stored. IVINS, [redacted] are employed at the United States Army Medical Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Frederick, Maryland. The office space utilized by the noted individuals are all located within Building 1425 at USAMRIID.

It was agreed by the consenting individuals that all original floppy disks and other non-imaged media would be returned to the owners as soon as imaging can be completed by WFO CART.

A copy of the FD-26 Consent to Search forms, FD-597s signed by [redacted] IVINS, and [redacted] and photographic images of material imaged from [redacted] office space will be maintained in the 1A section of the file.

Investigation on 01/13/2005 at Frederick, Maryland

File # 279A-WF-222936-POI

Date dictated N/A

by

SA [redacted]

BEI - 44

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~~SECRET~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

- 1 -

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

DATE: 12-09-2008  
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/LSC  
REASON: 1.4 (C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 12-09-2033

Date of transcription 01/20/2005

On January 13, 2005, BRUCE EDWARD IVINS, white male, born April 22, 1946 with social security account number 280-44-5449, was interviewed at his place of employment, the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), by Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) [REDACTED] SA [REDACTED] [REDACTED] was present for portions of the interview. IVINS, who was already familiar with the identities of the interviewing agents, provided the following information:

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In regard to Bacillus anthracis (Ba) Ames strain samples IVINS has maintained over the years, IVINS has provided all of his samples, or subsamples of all of his samples, to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). When SA [REDACTED] went through IVINS inventory of samples inside containment Suite B3 of building 1412, USAMRIID, [REDACTED] took all remaining Ames samples and locked them in a lockbox inside B3. To clarify issues about the origin of several samples of Ames, IVINS referred to a letter he had prepared for SA [REDACTED] on September 4, 2003 after researching his documentation. He provided a copy of this letter to SSA [REDACTED] during this interview.

Only one subculture of Ames was prepared in 1985, and IVINS did not prepare the sample himself. The origin of the July 30, 1985 subculture was the original 1981 Ames slant, but IVINS is unsure of the handling of it in terms of whether or not the Ames was passaged between the 1981 and 1985 samples. He does not know of any other information which would clarify that issue and cannot say for certain that the one 1985 sample came directly from the 1981 slant. He also does not know if the 1985 sample is vegetative cells or spores. Back during that time-frame, they grew Ames in broth, added glycerol, and froze the samples. The 1985 sample is not labeled with the date to IVINS recollection. IVINS suggested that [REDACTED] be interviewed about the 1985 sample because he believes they were the researchers who prepared it. After some period of time, IVINS was unsure of the date, IVINS never went back to the 1985 sample to make new Ames preparations.

In 1987, IVINS, [REDACTED] prepared two sets of Ba samples. Both the Ames strain and Vollum 1B strain were each prepared in two ways: Leighton-Doi broth and sheep's blood agar. When IVINS prepared the 1987 Ames samples with the two types of

Investigation on 1/13/2005 at Fort Detrick, Maryland

b6  
b7CFile # 279A-WF-222936-~~USAMRIID~~ <sup>18E1-45</sup> <sub>1072</sub> Date dictated N/A

by SSA [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ivins/05. wpa

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279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of Bruce Edward Ivins, On 1/13/2005, Page 2

growth media, he went back to the original 1981 slant of Ames to prepare them. These samples were made in June 1987. The Ames made by [redacted] in 1987 was produced in May 1987, and the paper documentation IVINS has on this sample is in their handwriting. IVINS is not absolutely certain that the FBI has the 1987 samples of Ames made by [redacted]. The samples were at one time stored frozen in the chest freezer in B3. If the samples were present when SA [redacted] inventoried IVINS' Ames (meaning all of the Ames in Suite B3), then the samples should be in the lockbox, and in the FBI's possession.

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The 1989 subculture is the one IVINS made himself from the 1981 original slant.

IVINS does not recall how the 1985 and 1987 samples are labeled. He does not believe they are labeled with the dates of production. IVINS just routinely identified the samples by their location in his laboratory.

Regarding samples transferred between USAMRIID and Dugway Proving Grounds, IVINS' shipment request form for the October 1992 Ames shipment to Dugway showed a concentration of  $8 \times 10^8$  spores per milliliter (ml). This concentration matches that shown on a folded page stapled onto page 56 of laboratory notebook #2064. The entry on the folded page which shows  $8.3 \times 10^8$  spores per ml is listed as a Leighton-Doi preparation of Ames from May 1987. That sample was the one prepared by [redacted] not by IVINS. Therefore, IVINS believes the sample of Ames he sent to Dugway in 1992 was the May 1987 [redacted] preparation.

The 1997 shipment of Ames to Dugway was spores from RMR 1030 to be used to produce the spores for RMR 1029. After looking in his laboratory notebook, #4010, IVINS provided the concentration of RMR 1030 as  $2.5\text{-}2.9 \times 10^{10}$  spores per ml. It was a liquid preparation. On page 86 of IVINS' laboratory notebook #3655, (#19 in his numbering system) he estimated RMR 1030 at  $1.5 \times 10^{10}$  spores per ml. IVINS suggested that this estimate be compared with his shipping request form for the 1997 Dugway shipment of Ames. If the concentration on the form is from  $1\text{-}3 \times 10^{10}$  spores per ml, and if the forms shows that the sample was in a liquid state, IVINS would be certain that the 1997 shipment was RMR 1030. He could not locate this form in his office during the interview.

IVINS' record of the dissemination of Reference Material Receipt (RMR) 1029, the Ames spores which were a combination of

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279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of Bruce Edward Ivins, On 1/13/2005, Page 3

Dugway-produced spores and spores made by IVINS, was kept only for the purpose of allowing the researchers to estimate how much of the material was left so they would not run out of spores for aerosol challenges. The record was not kept as any kind of precise inventory for security reasons. The amounts of remaining material were only estimates and were not accurately measured for each entry.

The entry on IVINS' [ ] record for Protocol B97-05, dated March 23, 1999, documents the first time that [ ] was ever taken to USAMRIID building 1412. The study was not an aerosol challenge, but was an injection challenge on guinea pigs. Only approximately one (1) ml was taken to 1412 at that time. IVINS thinks the rooms used in 1412 for the injection study were [ ] and [ ]. The entry on the record for [ ] dated September 17, 1998 was for a characterization and outgrowth study comparing spores which were germinating with vegetative spores.

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The first aerosol challenge which utilized [ ] was conducted on April 3, 2000 and was the first part of Protocol B00-03.

IVINS mentioned the recent issue discussed with SA [ ] regarding the concentration of RMR 1029 when it was returned to IVINS from the FBI. IVINS had gone back through his documentation after talking with SA [ ] and had listed the concentrations of RMR 1029 at various points in time since its creation. The concentration over time ranged from  $3.1-5.2 \times 10^{10}$  spores per ml. When the sample was returned to IVINS from the FBI, he found the concentration to be  $2.4 \times 10^{10}$  spores per ml.

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For the concentrations determined by IVINS, he swirled the flask of RMR 1029 to mix the spore preparation, removed a subsample and prepared dilutions, then plated the  $10^{-8}$  dilution. He then counted the colonies which grew from this dilution.

The decreased spore concentration of RMR 1029 after its return to IVINS was not a major problem. They readjusted the sample by adding more spores to it so there was enough Ames material for [ ] vaccine challenge.

IVINS found it interesting or ironic that [ ] had an Ames sample labeled [ ]. The spores were actually made in 1993.

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279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of Bruce Edward Ivins, On 1/13/2005, Page 4

IVINS is not certain that the FBI has a copy of his culture notebook. This notebook is maintained inside Suite B3, and USAMRIID policy does not allow the researchers to remove paper records from the containment suites. The culture record is only about one to three pages in length. IVINS agreed to enter the suite, hold the open notebook up to the window, and let the FBI photograph each page.

[redacted] and IVINS were at a recent [redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted]

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~~XXX~~ [redacted] described to IVINS his experience with the FBI in relation to the ongoing investigation of the 2001 anthrax-laced letter mailings. [redacted] told IVINS that he was firmly interrogated at the United States Attorney's Office and that the whole experience was just awful.

When IVINS was in [redacted] house, he noticed [redacted] had a large safe in which he kept ammunition and weapons. Though [redacted] really likes "all that stuff", he is really a nice guy. The book on eugenics which was referenced in a previous interview of IVINS was just one of the books IVINS noticed in [redacted] residence.

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There were some samples made by IVINS' group using a 1950's protocol. Nutrient agar which was missing the salts was used, and the samples were allowed to "just sit and sit and sit". IVINS believes these samples were only Vollum 1B and not Ames.

IVINS verified that the Bioport vaccine challenge using RMR 1029 was conducted with rabbits at USAMRIID for Bioport. IVINS did not send Ames to Bioport.

When IVINS was at Battelle Memorial Institute, some of the Battelle employees talked about work PERRY MIKESELL did with Ames in the early 1990's. IVINS thought it very strange because IVINS never sent Ames to Battelle. He since wondered if MIKESELL might have sent it to himself or taken it with him when he left USAMRIID.

NOTE: IVINS was interviewed in his office while waiting for FBI Computer Analysis Response Team (CART) personnel to mirror the hard drive on his desktop computer under a consent search form

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279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of Bruce Edward Ivins, On 1/13/2005, Page 5

signed by IVINS. During the waiting period he accessed his computer on several occasions to look up items unrelated to anthrax work. He had previously, before the interview, searched his archived e-mail for the term "Ames" to determine how many items referencing Ames were in that archive. The number was apparently in excess of 500. IVINS was advised not to delete or alter any files until the FBI work was completed. He was not left alone in his office between the time he was asked for consent and the time the mirror image was made. IVINS did not know whether his e-mail archive, which goes back many years, is maintained on his hard drive or on the USAMRIID server. He advised SSA [ ] that his e-mail archive was readily available to the FBI for copying, even if it was located on the server. During the course of the interview, IVINS searched his office for all diskettes, CDs, or other electronic storage media which might be related to the Ames strain in any way.

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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 01/26/2005

On January 26, 2005, circa 12:39 P.M., Postal Inspector [redacted] and Special Agent (SA) [redacted] of the Federal Bureau of Investigation met with BRUCE E. IVINS, as pre-arranged, at his place of employment, United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Bacteriology Division, work address: 1425 Porter Street, Fort Detrick, Maryland.

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IVINS provided the FBI with one (1) Iomega® 100 MB Zip Disk, titled "spore talk Dec 04." The above captioned 100 MB Zip Disk is to be entered as 1B evidence.

IVINS signed a FD-597 and was provided a copy of the same. The original FD-597 is maintained in the FD-340 attached to this communication.



Investigation on 01/25/2005 at Frederick, Maryland

b6  
b7CFile # 279A-WF-222936-1000*BEI-46*Date dictated N/Aby SA [redacted]  
Postal Inspector [redacted]



- 1 -

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 02/02/2005

Special Agent Forensic Examiner (SAFE) [redacted] and Special Agent (SA) [redacted] Computer Analysis Response Team (CART), Washington Field Office (WFO), participated in a consensual search at the offices of [redacted] and Bruce Ivins, United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), 1425 Porter Street, Fort Detrick, Maryland. CART was tasked with the imaging of computers and digital storage media found at the above offices relevant to the below listed investigation. As such, the following describes work performed by CART:

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One Apple computer, [redacted]

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One Apple laptop computer, [redacted]

Also, numerous types of portable storage media was provided to CART for imaging: 3.5" floppy disks, zip disks, 2 GB jaz disks, and CD-Rs. (note: SA [redacted] obtained the types of media for seizure and imaging. Digital photos of portable media were taken - see 1A.)

One Dell computer, [redacted]

[redacted] The HDD containing the image was labeled "Ivins\_WS1\_1".

Investigation on 01/13/2005 at Frederick, MDFile # 279A-WF-222936-6799Date dictated 02/02/2005by SA [redacted]  
SA [redacted]b6  
b7C



279A-WF-222936

Continuation of FD-302 of USAMRIID, On 01/13/2005, Page 2

One Dell computer, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The  
HDD containing the image was labeled "Ivins\_LabB5\_1".

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Also, numerous types of portable storage media was provided to CART for imaging: 3.5" floppy disks and zip disks. (note: SA [REDACTED] obtained the types of media for seizure and imaging. Digital photos of portable media were taken - see 1A.)

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All the above items were appropriately imaged, collected, and/or provided to the SA [REDACTED] FBI, Amerithrax-1, for transport and inventory purposes to the FBI-WFO Evidence Control.

All digital forensic worksheets, notes, and CD containing photos will be serialized and maintained within the above CART sub-file.

- 1 -

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 02/03/2005

On January 19, 2005 BRUCE E. IVINS, researcher at the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland, sent a facsimile to Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) [REDACTED] of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. SSA [REDACTED] received the facsimile on January 21, 2005. The facsimile pertained to Ames spore preparations from USAMRIID about which SSA [REDACTED] had inquired in an interview of IVINS on January 13, 2005. The facsimile received from IVINS is maintained in the 1A section of the file, and a copy is attached hereto.

b6  
b7CInvestigation on 01/21/2005 at Frederick, MarylandFile # 279A-WF-222936-<sup>BEI-48</sup>USAMRIID-1071 Date dictated N/Ab6  
b7C

by SSA [REDACTED]

*ivins fax. wpd*

U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases

FAX Phone Numbers:

DSN  Commercial

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b7c

**Facsimile Transmittal Header Sheet**

Bacteriology Division USAMRIID Fort Detrick Frederick, MD 21702-5011	Office Symbol MCMR-UIB	Phone DSN <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	Point of Contact Bruce Ivins <input type="text"/> Bacteriology Division
TO: <input type="text"/> FBI Washington Field Office		<input type="text"/>	
DATE: 19 JAN 05		Number of pages + this page = 1 total.	

**REMARKS:**

Re: Ames spore preparations from 1987

I searched our freezer in the B3 hallway yesterday but didn't find any Ames spores from either May of 1987 (prepared by  or June of 1987 (prepared by me). I talked to  about the preps and their whereabouts or disposition.  said that I gave her (in 1989) Ames spore preps from frozen stocks, and that those preps have been given to the FBI. It is quite possible that what was given her was from 1987, but I don't have a record of it.  said that he thinks it is likely that the preps may have been either used or deconned (by autoclaving) in the following years. (From 1989 until 2002, my stock culture used (for preparing further spore preps) was basically the 1989 spores, which were made from the original Ames slant.)  said that she didn't recall ever using the 1987 preps in our work.

Dugway Proving Ground received spores from us in 1992, which apparently came from 1987 spore stocks. They may be a source of the 1987 material, if they still have some of the original spores we sent them. It should be pointed out that there was - and is - no formal mechanism for culture or subculture or strain stock transfer when individuals left the division or stopped going into the hot suite. As such,  stock cultures and  stock cultures were not officially transferred to another investigator. Similarly, Perry Mikesell never officially transferred his stocks.

I'm sorry that I couldn't be more helpful in physically locating all the samples you're interested in, but perhaps  material or material at Dugway Proving Ground is what you're seeking.

Sincerely,

Bruce Ivins

Request acknowledgement of receipt - Yes ☒ No ☐ Phone   
Call AV  Commercial  if you experience difficulty in message transmission.

*"Research for the Soldier"*

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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 02/03/2005

[redacted] On 02/02/2005, Special Agents [redacted] and [redacted]  
[redacted] returned the following items to Dr. Bruce Ivins at the  
United States Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious  
Disease (USAMRIID):

b6  
b7C

Eleven 3 1/2" floppy disks  
Eight Zip disks

Ivins accepted custody of these items and signed an FD-597 (Receipt for Property Received/Returned/Released/Seized). A copy of the FD-597 was provided to Ivins and is attached to this FD-302. The original FD-597 is maintained in an FD-340 in the 1A section of the file.

Investigation on 02/02/2005 at Fort Detrick, Maryland

File # 279A-WF-222936-~~USAMRIID~~ - 1073 <sup>BEI - 49</sup> Date dictated 02/03/2005

by SA [redacted]  
SA [redacted]

b6  
b7C

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
Receipt for Property Received/Returned/Released/Seized

File # 279A-WF-222936

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 12-09-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/LSC


On (date) FEBRUARY 2, 2005

item(s) listed below were:

- ☐ Received From  
☒ Returned To  
☐ Released To  
☐ Seized

(Name) Bruce Ivins(Street Address) Building 1425, USAMRIID(City) Fort Detrick, MD

Description of Item(s): 11 3 1/2" Floppy Disks  
8 Zip Disks



b6  
b7c

Received By: Stacy E. Ivins  
(Signature)

Received From:



- 1 -

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 02/16/2005

On February 2, 2005, BRUCE EDWARD IVINS left a voice mail message for Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) [REDACTED] of the Federal Bureau of Investigation as follow-up to a matter discussed in an interview of IVINS on January 13, 2005. IVINS provided the following information:

b6  
b7C

After reviewing the shipping form for the *Bacillus anthracis* Ames strain samples he sent to Dugway Proving Ground in 1997, IVINS believes the tubes he sent were samples of RMR 1030, a mixed batch of spores prepared by IVINS and [REDACTED]. The reason he believes this to be true is that the shipping form indicates the samples were spores in liquid form, unfrozen. The only Ames spores IVINS had unfrozen in liquid form in his laboratory at that time were the spores known as RMR 1030. Also, he compared the concentration of spores in the shipment to the concentration of samples he had in his laboratory at the time of the shipment. The documented concentration for RMR 1030 closely matched that on the shipping form for the spores sent as seed stock to Dugway for the mass production of spores to be used in aerosol challenge studies.

On a separate issue, IVINS verified that he found RMR 1029 to be  $2.4 \times 10^{10}$  colony forming units (CFU) per milliliter (ml) and not  $2.4 \times 10^9$  CFU/ml after it was returned to him from FBI custody. IVINS said that the viability was only down 20-30%, not 90%, and that they were able to fix the problem by adding more spores for the aerosol challenge for [REDACTED].

Investigation on 02/02/2005 at Tyson's Corner, Virginia (telephonically)

File # 279A-WF-222936-~~USAMRIID~~ *BEI 50*

Date dictated N/A

by SSA [REDACTED]

b6  
b7C

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency;

*Till... FV10205.wpd*

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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 02/03/2005

On February 2, 2005 BRUCE IVINS, researcher at the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland left a voice mail message for Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) [redacted] of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Earlier on February 2, SSA [redacted] had sent to IVINS a copy of IVINS' Shipping Request Form for a batch of *Bacillus anthracis* Ames strain sent by IVINS to Dugway Proving Ground in 1997 for the preparation of an Ames spore stock known as RMR 1029. In a prior interview on January 13, 2005, IVINS had advised SSA [redacted] that the spore concentration shown on that shipping form should allow him to check his laboratory notebooks and identify the Ames sample he sent for Dugway to use as seed stock. [redacted]

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b7C

IVINS stated in the voice mail message that the concentration shown on the 1997 shipping form made him believe that RMR 1030 was the Ames material he sent to Dugway for use in the mass production of spores for the making of RMR 1029. He advised that the information to support his belief could be found in his USAMRIID laboratory notebook #3655, page 86.

Investigation on 02/02/2005 at Frederick, Maryland (telephonically)File # 279A-WF-222936-1 BEI-51 USAMRIID-1070 Date dictated N/A

by SSA [redacted]

b6  
b7C

ivins107.wpd

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## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 02/22/2005

BRUCE E. IVINS, white male, was interviewed at his place of employment, the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Bacteriology Division, 1425 Porter Street, Fort Detrick, Maryland, work telephone: [REDACTED] on the afternoon of February 17, 2005. Also present during the interview was [REDACTED] Date of Birth (DOB): [REDACTED] who is [REDACTED] After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Postal Inspector and Special Agent (SA), IVINS provided the following information:

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IVINS advised the printout of the electronic USAMRIID foreign visiting scientist which listed [REDACTED] as a Point of Contact (POC) was errant. IVINS further advised he was the USAMRIID POC for an Egyptian male, [REDACTED] from the University of Michigan circa [REDACTED] IVINS advised the electronic USAMRIID foreign visiting scientist record had misspelled [REDACTED] as [REDACTED]

IVINS advised prior to May 1998 he was contacted by [REDACTED] from the University of Michigan Medical Center who was [REDACTED] of a [REDACTED] IVINS advised [REDACTED] wished to collaborate with IVINS in order to test the effectiveness of a new anti-sporicidal material against anthrax spores. IVINS further advised [REDACTED] had numerous visits to USAMRIID, however "never accessed the B3 suite."

IVINS advised [REDACTED] sent [REDACTED] both from the University Michigan, to conduct experiments. IVINS advised [REDACTED] underwent safety training and provided the required documentation of their shot records. IVINS advised when [REDACTED] showed up at USAMRIID, USAMRIID personnel realized [REDACTED] was not a U.S. citizen. IVINS advised, during the May 1999 time period, a email request for approval was all that was required for "green card holders" to visit USAMRIID. IVINS further advised [REDACTED] provided approval for [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] interjected and advised "the request for [REDACTED] to visit USAMRIID did not come from command it came from [IVINS]."  
[REDACTED] further advised "this is different from which I had previously told [the interviewing Postal Inspector and SA]."

Investigation on 02/17/2005 at Frederick, MarylandFile # 279A-WF-222936-~~USAMRIID~~ <sup>BEI-52</sup> ~~W33~~Date dictated N/Ab6  
b7Cby SA [REDACTED]  
Postal Inspector [REDACTED]



279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID

Continuation of FD-302 of Bruce Ivins, On 02/17/2005, Page 2

IVINS advised [ ] had contacted IVINS and [ ] and [ ] were to come to USAMRIID and conduct the research on the collaboration project.

b6  
b7C

IVINS advised [ ] worked with the Ames strain of *Bacillus anthracis* (Ba) in the "BL-3 laboratory" for three or four days in May 1998. IVINS further advised [ ] and [ ] were never left alone in the BL-3 laboratory and either IVINS or [ ] were with [ ]

IVINS advised he does not recall whether or not [ ] and [ ] had their own access into the B3 suite or whether or not someone had to let them in. IVINS further advised the interviewing Postal Inspector and SA to check USAMRIID key card entries.

IVINS advised he was not impressed with their scientific techniques. IVINS further advised [ ] were "at each others throats." IVINS advised [ ] was "a jerk" and had problems with everyone to include [ ]

IVINS advised he referred to [ ] as [ ] because IVINS observed a thick patch of hair on the small of [ ] back while they were "showering out."

IVINS agreed to contact the interviewing Postal Inspector and SA should he recall any additional pertinent information.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
FOIPA  
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET

No Duplication Fees are charged for Deleted Page Information Sheet(s).

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